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The increasing globalization in recent years means that issues related to cross-
border transactions have greater impact on Þrm value. In this paper I examine
two aspects of them: asymmetric information and foreign exchange risk. In
the Þrst essay, I empirically examine the impact of information asymmetry on
characteristics of cross-border mergers. The role of asymmetric information
regarding the acquirers quality is motivated in the context of an entry decision
model where there exists a Þxed entry cost associated with direct entry and
asymmetric information in the merger process. I Þnd that acquisitions will
more likely be foreign Þrms mode of entry for those industries that are less
competitive or have higher entry costs. Further, I show that acquirers (targets)
in cross-border deals experience smaller (larger) wealth gains than do acquir-
ers (targets) in domestic cross-industry deals. These differences in takeover
premiums are mainly driven by entries into those industries with small Þxed
entry cost or high level of competition. Finally, I Þnd that target and bidder
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takeover premiums vary systematically across different industries and bidders
from different countries according to the degree of information asymmetry
involved. The empirical results imply that asymmetric information affects for-
eign Þrms mode of foreign direct investment and causes the market to react
differently to domestic cross-industry and cross-border mergers in the U.S. In
the second essay, I investigate another problem that widely affects all Þrms in-
volved in foreign businesses. That is, I try to explain how much a Þrms stock
price should be affected the currency risk. Using a sample of U.S. manufactur-
ing Þrms, I Þnd that Þrms with higher expected costs of Þnancial distress, as
proxied by lower liquidity, higher level of short-term leverage, smaller size and
greater growth opportunity, are more likely to exhibit signiÞcant exchange rate
exposures. At the industry level, the relation between exchange rate exposure
and expected cost of Þnancial distress appears to be even stronger. Finally,
using an event study methodology, I provide evidence that Þrms with higher
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Chapter 1
Issues Related to Cross-Border
Transactions
The past decades have seen dramatic development of foreign trade, foreign
direct investment, and international Þnancial markets. Various barriers to in-
ternational capital ßow such as lack of tax harmonization, government restric-
tions on foreign investment, high transaction costs have fallen substantially.
The increasing globalization means that issues related to cross-border trans-
actions have greater impact on Þrm value than before. Current research has
documented signiÞcant beneÞts of global integration. For example, according
to De Santis and Gerard (1997), the expected gains from international diversi-
1
Þcation for an investor average 2.11 percent per year. At the same time, there
is also evidence that investors have not fully realized the beneÞts by invest-
ing in foreign markets as much as one would expect. One obvious example is
the well-documented home bias.1 Moreover, as shown in Christophe (1997)
international operations during the early 1980s are associated with decreased
Þrm value due to sunk costs required to establish foreign market shares and
hysteresis in response to currency ßuctuation. Therefore, it is important to
clearly identify issues that will become more pronounced when Þrms from dif-
ferent cultural and economic backgrounds are involved. In this study, I focus
on two aspects of them: asymmetric information and foreign exchange risk.
In the Þrst essay, I empirically examine the impact of information asym-
metry on characteristics of cross-border mergers. The role of asymmetric in-
formation regarding the acquirers quality is motivated in the context of an
entry decision model where there exists a Þxed entry cost associated with
direct entry and asymmetric information regarding the bidders value in the
merger process. I show that whether foreign Þrms enter a new market via
direct entry or cross-border mergers depends on the trade-off between these
two types of costs. In equilibrium, entry mode signals the type of the entrant:
1See French and Porterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Kang and Stulz (1997)
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high efficiency entrants enter directly while low efficiency ones enter through a
merger. Therefore, across different industries and over time we should expect
more mergers than direct investments when Þxed entry costs are larger. Fur-
thermore, since information asymmetry is resolved through the revelation of a
Þrms entry mode, the abnormal returns for the target and bidder around an
acquisition should reßect the actual impact of the entry on the target and the
true type of the bidder. In other words, how the market reacts to a merger
announcement is related to the degree of information asymmetry.
Using the data of cross-border mergers in the U.S. during the period
of 1981-1998, I Þnd that the more severe asymmetric information involved in
cross-border mergers causes the market to react very differently to cross-border
mergers as compared to domestic cross-industry mergers.
A number of previous studies have examined the role of asymmetric
information in the merger process. For example, Fishman (1989) studies the
role of the medium of exchange when target and bidder management each has
private information about the proÞtability of an acquisition. Similarly, Eckbo,
Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) show that when the bidders value is not
known to the target, its revealed value is monotonically increasing and convex
in the amount of cash used in the offer. Note that in these studies asymmetric
3
information affects the method of payment but not Þrms real decisions. I
contribute to current literature by showing that asymmetric information affects
Þrms entry decisions as well as their market valuations. Moreover, given
that previous research (see, Harris and Ravanscraft, 1993; Swenson, 1993;
Dewenter, 1995; and Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000) has not reached consensus
regarding whether or why there exist differences in target or bidder takeover
premiums between domestic and cross-border mergers, my study also sheds
some light on this issue by linking it to the degree of information asymmetry
involved in these mergers.
In the second essay, I investigate another problem that widely impacts
all multinational Þrms. That is, I try to explain how much a Þrms value should
be affected by currency risk. I argue that although exchange rate movement
may have direct impact on Þrms cash ßows, its ultimate impact on their
stock prices varies cross-sectionally depending on the sensitivity of Þrm value
to volatility of short-term cash ßows. In other words, a Þrms stock price, as
a measure of Þrm value, is not necessarily affected by currency risk unless the
Þrms value is very sensitive to volatility of its cash ßows. The reason is that
multinational Þrms usually have broad base of local currency exposures that
are likely to offset each other in the long run. In addition, Þrms can always
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adjust themselves through operational hedging in the longer term. This, on
the one hand, suggests cross-sectional variation of foreign exchange exposure
with Þrms expected costs of Þnancial distress. On the other hand, it also
helps explain the failure to document signiÞcant exchange rate exposures in
previous research.
This study shows that the exchange rate risk becomes important to
a Þrms fundamental value only when the resulting short-term ßuctuation of
its cash ßows forces it into Þnancial distress or causes it to forsake investment
opportunities. In other words, among Þrms with signiÞcant foreign businesses,
stock prices of only a subset of them will exhibit signiÞcant sensitivities to
exchange rate movements.
Using a sample of U.S. manufacturing Þrms, I show that stock prices of
Þrms with higher expected costs of Þnancial distress, for example, lower liquid-
ity, smaller size and greater growth opportunities, are more likely to move with
exchange rate. Among Þrms with signiÞcant return exposures, the magnitude
of their exposures varies with variables that proxy for their expected Þnan-
cial distress costs. At the industry level, the relation between exchange rate
exposure and Þnancial characteristics becomes even more prominent. Finally,
using an event study methodology, I calculate Þrms abnormal returns and ab-
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normal volatilities around large, unexpected currency movements to measure
the economic signiÞcance of exchange rate exposures. The result shows that
Þrms responses to exchange rate shocks are economically large and vary with
their expected costs of Þnancial distress.
In summary, this study examines the effect of asymmetric information
and foreign exchange risktwo important problems commonly faced by Þrms in
multinational businesseson Þrm valuation. The evidences provided here will
help Þrms and investors identify potential risks in cross-border transactions
and their impacts on Þrms fundamental values.
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Chapter 2




2.1 Overview of the Study
Mergers and acquisitions surged substantially in terms of both the total num-
ber and the average value of deals during the 1990s. According to Gorton, Kahl
7
and Rosen (2000), the deal value of mergers and acquisitions in the United
States increased from $100 billion in 1991 to $1.6 trillion in 1998. A signiÞ-
cant portion of this activity was due to the dramatic increase of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions. According to W. T. Grimm, foreign acquisitions of
U.S. companies exceeded $170 billion in the last half of the 1980s, accounting
for 17% of the total U.S. deals during that period. By 1999, that Þgure had
climbed to 22%the highest level since 1990.1
Given the prominence of cross-border merger and acquisition in the U.S.
market as well as other markets around the world, it is important to understand
how these transactions affect shareholders wealth and whether they generate
a differential impact than do otherwise similar domestic mergers.2 Previous
research documents mixed results on this question. Some evidence suggests
signiÞcant differences between domestic and cross-border deals in terms of
their wealth effects on target and bidding Þrm shareholders. For example,
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Swenson (1993) examine abnormal returns
for U.S. targets around merger announcements and Þnd signiÞcantly higher
wealth gains for targets of foreign buyers than for targets of U.S. acquirers.
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) provide evidence for the Canadian market where
1Mergers Snapshot/Foreign Buyers, WSJ, June 19, 2000.
2Mergers, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions will be used interchangeably throughout
the paper hereafter.
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domestic bidders outperform the U.S. bidders in terms of takeover premi-
ums. These Þndings indicate that stock prices react differently to domestic
and cross-border takeover announcements. Further, the differences do not dis-
appear after controlling for the method of payment, managerial resistance,
competing bidders, industry differences, exchange rate movements and differ-
ent tax regimes. In contrast, Dewenter (1995) studies takeovers in the U.S.
chemical and retail industries and Þnds no differences between domestic and
cross-border deals in the takeover premium levels within each industry. Given
these diverse results, it is clear that current work has not reached consensus
regarding this issue, nor has it been able to explain why we should or should
not expect to observe any differences.
In this study, I further our understanding of cross-border mergers by
examining mergers from the perspective of a Þrms entry decision. Since a Þrm
can enter a new market either by establishing its own business or by taking
over an existing Þrm, the announcement of a cross-border merger reveals the
bidding Þrms choice of entry mode. The revelation of entry strategy provides
information to investors about the bidding Þrm and about the impact of the
entry on the target Þrm. This information is reßected in the abnormal returns
to the two merging parties around the announcement period. I show that due
9
to the higher level of information asymmetry in cross-border transactions, the
market reacts differently to domestic and foreign mergers.
Firms have various motivations for entering foreign markets, either
through mergers or through direct investments. They may want to gain mar-
ket power, to achieve Þnancial and operating synergy, or to adjust themselves
to changing environments brought by technological, regulatory or structural
shocks. These motives are often the same as those proposed for domestic
mergers. (See, for example, Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Unlike domestic
mergers, however, foreign Þrms are entering a market that is to some extent
segmented from their normal markets. They therefore face the unique chal-
lenge to communicate information about their quality to investors and target
Þrms in the new market. So there exists the information asymmetry in the
cross-border merger process which should be much more severe than in domes-
tic transactions. The signiÞcance of this information asymmetry is exhibited
by the extensive literature on home bias. Although various barriers to for-
eign investments have been reduced substantially in recent years, investors
propensity to invest in their home markets remains strong simply because of
the information problem.3 Therefore, it is not surprising to see that a target
3For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) suggest that foreign ownerships of Japanese stocks
are signiÞcantly lower in Þrms that are associated with more severe information asymmetry.
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Þrm has more difficulty learning information about a foreign bidder than that
of a comparable domestic bidder.
As an alternative to merger, direct investment involves certain level of
Þxed entry cost. For example, some upfront costs must be incurred when a
Þrm establishes its own business. Alternatively, the Þxed entry cost can be
related to various entry barriers. One obvious example is customer loyalty. If
a foreign Þrm tries to penetrate the U.S. soft drink market, then it has to Þrst
overcome customers preference for Coke or Pepsi products.
Given the issues related to different modes of entry, one path to un-
derstanding the differences between cross-border and domestic mergers and
acquisitions may be to Þrst answer the question of what drives foreign Þrms to
choose takeover over direct entry. In other words, what determines the entry
mode of a foreign company?
To motivate my empirical analysis about the importance of information
asymmetry in cross-border mergers, I develop a theoretical model based upon
the trade-off between the Þxed entry cost and the cost of information asym-
metry. More speciÞcally, the entry decision model presented in this study is
similar in spirit to that of McCardle and Viswanathan (1994), in which Þrms
choose between direct entry and merger when their efficiency in the new mar-
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kets is private information only known to managements. Unlike McCardle
and Viswanathan (1994), the information asymmetry in my model concerns
the potential entrants efficiency in the new market rather than its Þxed entry
cost. This setup allows the strategic response of other Þrms in the market to
feed back to the entrants equilibrium entry decision.
Two critical components of the model are the Þxed entry cost associated
with direct entry and the information asymmetry regarding bidders efficiency
in the new market. They together determine Þrms entry modes and the cross-
sectional variations in the markets reactions to different mergers. Without the
Þxed entry cost entrants are indifferent to different modes of entry. Without
asymmetric information, all entrants prefer to enter by taking over the incum-
bent to avoid the Þxed entry cost. Whether a separating equilibrium can be
achieved depends on the trade-off between the cost of asymmetric information
and the Þxed entry cost.
When the efficiency of the entrant is public information, merging with
one of the existing Þrms is preferable to direct entry due to the Þxed entry
cost. A high efficiency entrant will be able to take over the target at a lower
price than if it is of low efficiency. This is because it can always threaten to
enter the market directly and hurt the target through increased competition
12
if it has the ability to overcome the Þxed entry cost. However, when the
efficiency of the entrant is private information only known by the entrants
management, the low efficiency entrant has the incentive to mimic the high
efficiency one and essentially impedes it from acquiring the target Þrm at low
prices. Consequently, merger is not necessarily the optimal mode of entry.
Depending on the Þxed entry cost and the level of competition in the market,
there can be either a separating or a pooling equilibrium. If the Þxed entry
cost is low and the market is very competitive, a separating equilibrium can
be achieved where the entry mode signals the type of the entrant: the high
efficiency type enters the market directly, incurring the Þxed direct entry cost,
while the low efficiency type enters through a merger. Otherwise, a pooling
equilibrium sustains in which both types merge with the incumbent by paying
its reservation price.
The information asymmetry regarding the entrants efficiency in the
new market affects its choice of entry mode. Under the separating equilibrium,
the merger announcement, which eliminates the uncertainty about its entry
mode, conveys information to investors about the entrants type and the
actual impact of market entry on the target. This information is incorporated
into the announcement returns of the target and the acquirer. For the bidders
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shareholders, the merger announcement is a bad news because it reveals the
low efficiency of the bidder. Target shareholders, however, should experience
positive abnormal returns because the potential adverse impact of direct entry
on the target Þrm is avoided.
My model generates several testable implications about cross-border
deals in which both Þxed entry cost and asymmetric information are impor-
tant. In particular, it has implications on the cross-industry variation in the
mode of foreign direct investment and the differential wealth effects generated
by foreign versus domestic mergers. First, the higher the Þxed entry cost is
and the less competitive the market is, the more likely a pooling equilibrium
will be reached. Therefore, we should observe cross-industry variation in the
mode of foreign direct investment with the Þxed entry cost and the degree of
competition.4 Second, assuming more information asymmetry in cross-border
deals than in domestic cross-industry oneswhich is another type of market
entry, targets of foreign acquirers are expected to experience larger wealth
gains while foreign acquirers should realize smaller announcement period re-
turns. Moreover, since these overall differences are driven by the separating
equilibrium, they should be more prominent in those industries with low Þxed
4To test this prediction directly, one must be able to show that this relation is stronger
in cross-border direct entry than in domestic one. Unfortunately, data on domestic direct
entry are not available.
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entry costs and high levels of competition.
Although the implications of this model are not speciÞc to cross-border
mergers and can potentially be applied to other types of market entry, they
provide a new angle to examine cross-border mergers. First, I analyze cross-
sectional differences in the proportion of mergers and acquisitions relative to
total foreign direct investments. The results show that it varies signiÞcantly
across different industries in a systematic fashion. SpeciÞcally, using industry
characteristics that proxy for entry barriers and market competitiveness, I
show that the higher the Þxed entry cost is and the less competitive the market
is, the more likely it is that foreign companies will enter that industry via
takeovers.
Second, I examine the differences between domestic cross-industry and
cross-border mergers and acquisitions in terms of announcement abnormal
returns. Previous studies in this area do not distinguish different motivations
of mergers that can lead to different stock market responses to the merger
announcements. In this study I focus on mergers that are motivated by entries
into another market. In other words, I compare domestic entry into another
industry with cross-border entry into another country, which would involve
more severe information asymmetry. By taking this approach, I provide an
15
explanation for differential market reactions to domestic versus cross-border
mergers. In addition, my analysis spans a longer period and includes a larger
sample compared with previous studies on takeover premiums to targets and
bidders. Therefore, it has more power to detect any difference in wealth effects.
As predicted by the model, an event study analysis shows that cross-
border deals generate signiÞcantly lower (higher) takeover premium to bidders
(targets) than do domestic deals after controlling for the method of payment,
managerial resistance, outside competition, exchange rate movements, the rel-
ative sizes of the target and bidder, tax effects and reputation of investment
advisors. More importantly, these differences in shareholder wealth gains are
mainly driven by those deals that take place in industries with low levels of
Þxed entry cost or high levels of competition. Consistent with the information
asymmetry hypothesis, the differences are also much larger in industries that
are more likely to be subject to the information asymmetry problem. Finally,
I Þnd that even among cross-border deals, target and bidder announcement
abnormal returns vary across the bidders country according to the degree of
information asymmetry involved.
The rest of Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related
literature. Section 2.3 presents the model and discusses its empirical implica-
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tions. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 provide the empirical analysis on the two major
testable implications of the model. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 check the robustness
of the empirical analysis in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.9 concludes this
chapter.
2.2 Literature Review
Research on cross-border mergers largely exists in the FDI literature before
the 1990s. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) are among the Þrst to empirically
link corporate merger to FDI through the comparison of takeover premium
in domestic versus cross-border mergers. They provide evidence that costs
and imperfections in product market play are the main driving forces behind
cross-border mergers. By examining shareholder wealth gains for 1273 U.S.
Þrms acquired during 1970-1987, they also Þnd that targets of foreign buyers
have signiÞcantly higher wealth gains than do targets of U.S. acquirers. Simi-
larly, Swenson (1993) Þnds that target shareholder wealth gains generated in
foreign acquisitions are almost 10 percent in excess of those in similar domes-
tic acquisitions. Although both of these two studies show that the premium
earned by foreign buyers is higher when the dollar depreciates as suggested by
Froot and Stein (1991), they do not examine whether the effect of exchange
17
rate movement can explain difference in wealth gains between domestic and
cross-border mergers. Furthermore, they Þnd no evidence that deal charac-
teristics, tax variables, or industrial variables have any explanatory power for
the difference.
More recently, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) look into difference between
domestic and cross-border takeovers in terms of gains to bidders. They exam-
ine the performance of U.S.(foreign) and Canadian(domestic) bidder Þrms in
the Canadian corporate control market during 1964-1983. In their study, do-
mestic bidders are those Þrms that are traded on the TSE and foreign Þrms are
those NYSE listed Þrms. They show that domestic bidders earn signiÞcantly
positive average announcement period abnormal returns while the returns to
foreign bidder are indistinguishable from zero. Among potential reasons for
the difference, such as government control on FDI, relatedness of businesses of
the two parties, method of payment, managerial resistance, and relative sizes
of target and bidder, there is weak evidence to support the explanation that it
is due to the measurement problem resulting from the larger size of US bidders
compared with that of Canadian bidders.
Contrary to Þndings in these studies, Dewenter (1995) looks at takeovers
in U.S. chemical and retail industries and concludes that there is no difference
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in mean target takeover premia within industry. One possible explanation
for this inconsistence may be that there exists cross industry variation in the
differential market reactions to domestic and cross-border mergers depending
on industry characteristics.
Recently, some studies model the merger activity from the perspective
of entry decision that may shed light on our understanding of cross-border
takeovers. McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) develop a Cournot oligopoly
model to examine what factors determine a potential entrants mode of en-
try. Under information asymmetry regarding the Þxed entry cost, the entrant
reveals its type through its entry strategy. In a separating equilibrium, the
high entry cost Þrm chooses to merge with the incumbent while the low entry
cost one chooses to enter directly. In response to information revealed from
the entry mode, stock price of the acquirer drops and that of the target rises
around the merger announcement. The results of their model are consistent
with the extensive evidence on the asymmetric wealth effect of mergers on
target and bidder shareholders.
The main focus of McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) is on stock per-
formance around takeover announcement. It doesnt discuss cross-sectional
differences in equilibrium entry mode and in markets reaction to merger an-
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nouncement. But this approach of modeling merger activity has some interest-
ing implications to cross-border mergers where both asymmetric information
and Þxed entry cost are signiÞcant. In this study, I try to explore whether
or how the market reacts to domestic and cross-border takeovers differently
by examining the relative role of these two factors in merger activity. I Þnd
that markets reaction to these two types of mergers is highly correlated with
characteristics of industries and foreign countries involved.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 The Set-Up
Since the main purpose of the model is to understand a single decision of di-
rect entry versus merger with asymmetric information, the basic setup follows
McCardle and Viswanathan (1994) but is simpliÞed to be a one period model
with two Þrms. Firm 1 is an incumbent Þrm in a pre-existing market with the
marginal cost of CI . Firm 2 has the opportunity to enter that market from a
foreign country. The market inverse demand function is deÞned by:
P = a− b ∗Q; a > 0, b > 0
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where P is the market price and Q is the total quantity produced in the market.
Firm 2 is considering entering the market by either direct entry or taking over
the incumbent. If it enters directly, it will incur a Þxed entry cost of F. In
addition, if Þrm 2 enters the market directly, the objective of both Þrms will be
to maximize proÞts by choosing the optimal quantity in each period given the
opponents strategy. Firm 2 is of two possible types depending on its marginal
cost. If Þrm 2 is a high efficiency entrant(H), it has a small marginal cost
denoted by CS. If Þrm 2 is a low efficiency entrant(L), it has a large marginal
cost denoted by CB. The following additional assumptions are made about
the Þrms and the market:
 The entrants type is private information known by the entrants man-
agement, but not by its shareholders or the incumbent. The incumbent
and investors prior belief that an entrant is of type H is of probability
1/2.
 Whether CI ≤ CS < CB, CS < CI ≤ CB or CS < CB ≤ CI is common
knowledge. That is, whether the entrants marginal cost is greater than
or equal to or less than or equal to that of the incumbent is known by
the incumbent.
 The Þxed entry cost F is such that only the high efficiency entrants post
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direct entry proÞt will be large enough to recover it. That is, πE,L2 < F <




2 are proÞts the low and high efficiency types
can make after direct entry. In other words, H has the option between
direct entry and takeover depending on the cost of paying a high price
to acquirer Þrm 1 and the beneÞt of avoiding the Þxed direct entry cost.
L can only enter through taking over Þrm 1.
 The combined Þrm is more proÞtable than two stand-alone Þrms in the





where πM,H2 and π
E,H
1 are proÞts H can make after taking over Þrm 1 and
Þrm 1 can make if H enters directly. ΠE,H2 = π
E,H
2 − F is the payoff of
H after direct entry net of the Þxed entry cost.
 There is no correlation between the Þxed entry cost and the marginal
cost of the entrant. That is, the correlation between F and CB or CS is
zero.
 If the entrant chooses to enter by merger, it makes a take-or-leave-it offer
to the target.
 If a merger is successful, the combined Þrm will adopt the technology of
the more efficient one of the two merging Þrms.
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 If Þrm 2 enters the market directly, it will enter a two-Þrm Cournot
competition with Þrm 1.
 There are no taxes.
 There are no agency problems. The managements of both Þrms always
act on behalf of their shareholders.
 Firm 2s motivation to enter the preexisting market is exogenous, that
is, Þrm 1 cannot affect that motivation through any action.
2.3.2 Symmetric Information
Before analyzing Þrm 2s entry decision, consider what happens if the efficiency
of the entrant Þrm is public information. Without asymmetric information
between Þrm 1 and Þrm 2 about Þrm 2s type, Þrm 2 will always prefer to
merge with Þrm 1 regardless of its efficiency level. This results because the
Þrm will face a Þxed entry cost if it enters directly. The Þxed entry cost
occurs only for direct entry because Þrms that establish their presence in new
markets usually need to spend money on plants, offices, legal fees and other
administrative expenses. The Þxed entry cost becomes more important if a
Þrm is entering another country due to non-Þnancial Þxed entry costs such as
language or culture differences. Although the assumption of a Þxed cost only
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in the case of direct entry is a simpliÞcation, as long as the Þxed cost is higher
in direct entry than in a merger, all results remain unchanged.
Under symmetric information, once Þrm 2 has made the merger offer,
Þrm 1 decides whether to accept the offer by weighing the bid against the
potential loss of proÞts if it turns down the offer and Þrm 2 adopts direct
entry subsequently. Since Þrm 1 knows that the low efficiency bidder (L)
is not able to enter the market directly, it will ask for a price no less than
its current proÞt when facing a bidder with type L. When facing the high
efficiency bidder (H), which can always access the market directly resulting
in lower future proÞts for Þrm 1, Þrm 1 will accept any offer that is equal
to or greater than its share of proÞts in the two-Þrm Cournot competition
with H. Notice that since the merged Þrm will adopt the technology of the
more efficient party, L will always get zero payoff after entering the market
if it is less efficient than Þrm 1. This leads to the question of Ls incentive
to conduct a zero NPV project. Although for simplicity I do not model any
synergy gain from mergers. In reality, it is possible that the merged Þrm will
be more efficient than either one of the two merger parties. In that case,
as long as L can get some of the synergy gain from the merger, it is always
better off by merging with Þrm 1. Sometimes even if there is no synergy
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gain from the merger, a Þrm may still have incentive to enter the market. It
could be that a foreign Þrm wants to merge with a U.S. Þrm in one line of its
business just to open the U.S. market for many other businesses because a lot
of the Þxed investment such as distribution centers, marketing networks, office
buildings, and administrative expenses can be shared among several segments.
For example, when the Korean Electronics producer, LG Electronics, acquired
Zenith to gain access to the North American TV market in 1995, it was actually
technologically less efficient than Zenith. But by merging with Zenith, it
beneÞted by establishing a distinct corporate image in the U.S. and associating
itself with a bellwether name that helped its competition in markets worldwide.
Thus, in equilibrium, both efficiency types prefer to enter through a
merger with Þrm 1 and avoid the Þxed entry cost of F. But L will have to pay
more to acquire Þrm 1 than does L.
Result 1 : Under symmetric information, both type H and type L entrant will
enter by taking over Þrm 1. H will bid BH and L will bid BL with BL > BH .
Proof : see appendix A.1.
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2.3.3 Asymmetric Information
When the efficiency type of the entrant is not known by the target, L always
has the incentive to mimic H so that it can acquire Þrm 1 at a lower price.
Since Þrm 1 cannot tell whether a potential entrant approaching it with the bid
of BH is of type H or L, it will decide whether to accept the offer by comparing
the bid from an unknown type of Þrm 2 with the expected proÞt it will earn
if it rejects the bid. If an offer is from L, that is, the low efficiency entrant,
then Þrm 1 will not lose anything by rejecting the merger offer because Ls
efficiency is such that its post entry proÞt in a two-Þrm Cournot competition
is not large enough to recover the Þxed entry cost. However, if Þrm 1 rejects a
bid from H, H will then enter the market directly and Firm 1s proÞt will be
reduced to its share in the two-Þrm Cournot competition. Before the type of
the entrant is revealed, Þrm 1s expected proÞt given potential direct entry of














1 is Þrm 1s current proÞt. Notice that the maximum bid H will be willing
to pay is deÞned by:
πM,H2 − BH ≥ ΠE,H2 (2.2)
Equation 2.2 shows that the maximum bid H is willing to pay is the difference
between πM,H2 and Π
E,H
2 , which is the difference between what it will earn if
it takes over Þrm 1 and what it will earn if it enters the market directly. This
difference is an implicit function of the Þxed entry cost and the competitiveness
of the market which is measured by b. If the Þxed entry cost is substantial
or b is large, then H will be more willing to pay a high bid as long as its net
payoff from the merger still out weighs its payoff after direct entry. On the
other hand, the maximum bid L will be willing to pay is its post-merger proÞt
because merging with Þrm 1 is the only option L has in order to enter the
market.
It can be shown that Þrm 1s expected proÞt after rejecting the offer can
be higher or lower than the maximum bid H could possibly offer depending
on the value of b and F. If max(BL) > E(πE1 ) > max(B
H), Þrm 1 is better
off by rejecting max(BH). That is, H will not bid at a price that can possibly
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be accepted by Þrm 1. Therefore, whenever an entrant offers to merge with
Þrm 1, it must be L. Given that L cannot conceal its type by mimicking H
under this circumstance, Þrm 1 will not accept any offer unless it is greater
than or equal to what it is now making in the market. Therefore, a separating
equilibrium exists where the incumbent will reject any offer less than BL. So
L bids for Þrm 1 and H enters directly. The type of the entrant is revealed
through its equilibrium entry mode. A separating equilibrium may exist when
the direct entry of H does not seriously hurt the proÞt of Þrm 1for example,
when b is small or the market is highly competitive. Alternatively, a separating
equilibrium can be sustained when the Þxed entry cost F is not large enough
and takeover is less attractive to H than direct entry is. A low value of F leads
to a very low max(BH) which is less than E(πE1 ), or what Þrm 1 expects to
earn if it rejects the merger offer. Therefore, H would rather suffer from the
Þxed entry cost than from the cost of information asymmetry if the Þxed entry
cost is small or the level of competition is high.
When E(πE1 ) < max(B
H), the separating equilibrium is not sustainable.
There exists a BH which will be accepted by the incumbent. In fact, since
Þrm 1 can not tell the type of entrant, Þrm 2 will offer a bid that leaves Þrm
1 just indifferent to accepting and rejecting the bid. Since Þrm 1s expected
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proÞt will be E(πE1 ) if it rejects the bid, it will accept any bid above E(π
E
1 )
which is its reservation price. In this case, there exists a pooling equilibrium
where both H and L bid for Þrm 1 with E(πE1 ).
Result 2 : When the type of the entrant is private information, there exists
either a separating equilibrium or a pooling equilibrium depending on the level
of b and F. Under the separating equilibrium, the low efficiency entrant will
enter the market by taking over Þrm 1 while the high efficiency one will enter
the market directly. Under the pooling equilibrium, both types of Þrm 2 will
choose to enter by merging with Þrm 1 at its reservation price. be sustainable.
Proof : see appendix A.2.
2.3.4 Extension
The equilibriums derived under asymmetric information are similar to those
proposed in McCardle and Viswanathan (1994). However, by modeling the
information asymmetry regarding the entrants efficiency rather than its Þxed
entry cost, the model allows the strategic behaviors of other Þrms in the market
to be endogenized. The response of other Þrms in the market will in turn
have a feedback effect on the entry decision of the entrant. Notice that in
reality there are usually more than one incumbent in a market. In that case,
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the merger between one of the existing Þrms and the potential entrant will
affect the proÞtability of all remaining Þrms in the industry. In some cases the
pooling equilibrium that is sustainable given a single incumbent may be broken
when there are more than one incumbent and when we take into account their





I < CB2 , the marginal cost of the merged Þrm is uncertain to other
incumbents under the pooling equilibrium because the merged Þrm will adopt
the efficiency of the bidder. Since Þrm 2s type is not revealed in the pooling
equilibrium, other incumbents output decisions are not based upon the true
marginal cost of the merged Þrm but their belief of it. As a result, Hs marginal
cost is over estimated and Ls is under estimated by other incumbents. This
hurts the post-merger proÞt of H and makes merger less attractive than direct
entry. When F or b is below a certain value, H will deviate from the pooling
equilibrium and enter directly. So the set of F and b that can support the
separating equilibrium is enlarged when there are more than one incumbent.
Result 3 : When there are more than one incumbent in the market and when
the type of the entrant is unknown to all incumbents, a pooling equilibrium
may not be sustainable.
Proof : see appendix A.3.
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2.3.5 Empirical Implications
The model has important testable empirical implications on how asymmetric
information affects both the mode of foreign direct investment and the target
and the bidder stock performance around takeover announcements.
First, this model suggests that avoiding the high direct entry cost is an
important factor in these merger and acquisition decisions. However, informa-
tion asymmetry reduces the number of merger transactions in the sense that
it impedes high efficiency entrants from takeovers under a separating equilib-
rium. Thus, fewer mergers should occur if the cost asymmetric information is
larger than the Þxed entry cost. According to those parameters in the model
that determine whether a separating equilibrium is sustainable, we should ob-
serve fewer takeover transactions in industries that are more competitive and
that involve lower direct entry costs.
Second, under asymmetric information, there exists a separating equi-
librium where those Þrms that choose to enter an industry via mergers must be
low efficiency entrants. Upon the takeover announcement, the market should
revise its evaluation of the acquirers efficiency and the impact of the entry
on existing Þrms. Therefore, on the one hand, the stock price of the acquirer
should drop because its low efficiency is revealed to its shareholders. On the
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other hand, the targets stock price should respond favorably to the takeover
announcement. This is because before the type of the entrant is revealed the
existence of a potential direct entrant imposes a threat to future proÞts of
existing Þrms. When the potential entrant announces that it will not enter di-
rectly but will instead take over an existing Þrm, the threat to all existing Þrms
is resolved. Therefore, the merger announcement conveys favorable informa-
tion about the target and other existing Þrms. It carries no such information,
however, under the pooling equilibrium. Further, whether a separating or a
pooling equilibrium can be achieved depends on the value of F and b. This
implies that the negative and positive impact of the merger announcement
on the acquiring and the target Þrms, respectively, should be stronger when
the entry occurs in markets that are more competitive or have smaller entry
costs. In other words, the differences in target and bidder wealth gains under
symmetric versus asymmetric information should be more pronounced in those
markets.
Since key elements of the model are the Þxed entry cost and informa-
tion asymmetry, this model provides a unique angle to examine cross-border
mergers. A number of studies have examined the information asymmetry in
the merger process(see Fishman(1989) and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel
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(1990)). Unlike previous research, here the information asymmetry is con-
cerning the entrants efficiency in the new market, which may not be the same
as its efficiency in its current market. Compared with domestic cross-industry
market entry, cross-border mergers and acquisitions are subject to more severe
information asymmetry between targets and acquirers. This is exhibited by
the well-documented home bias: the strong preference for domestic securi-
ties by investors in international markets. Despite substantial diminishment
of government restrictions on capital ßows, foreign taxes, and other obsta-
cles, the home bias has not disappeared. One important explanation for the
home bias is the information asymmetry between domestic investors and for-
eign investors about the economic performance of domestic Þrms. Due to the
information disadvantage of foreign investors, investors have strong preference
for geographically proximate Þrms to which they have easy access. Kang and
Stulz (1997) Þnd that foreign investors hold disproportionately less of shares of
Þrms that are highly levered, small, have low turnover and export less. They
claim that this phenomenon may be the result of larger information asymmetry
associated with these Þrms. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) even Þnd evidence
supportive of information-based explanations for local equity preference. The
implication of the home bias puzzle on cross-border takeovers is that the
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information differences between bidders and targets are magniÞed when for-
eign acquirers are involved. Even for those cross-border mergers which involve
well-known multinational corporations from foreign countries, the fact that
target company or investors can have easy access to information concerning
their current efficiency does not necessarily imply that they have equally good
knowledge about the foreign acquirers future efficiency in the new markets.
In fact, foreign acquirers future efficiency may depend on how they are going
to allocate resources among their multinational operations, how successfully
they can realign their strategies to the new business, and many other Þrm
speciÞc factors that are beyond the scope of the target Þrm. Thus, tests about
the role of asymmetric information in determining Þrms entry decision can
be conducted by comparing two different types of market entry: domestic
cross-industry mergers versus cross-border mergers.
SpeciÞcally, when we examine cross-border mergers and acquisitions,
the information asymmetry relates primarily to the future efficiency of foreign
bidders in the domestic market because target Þrms already have a presence
in the market. In this study my empirical analysis involves those cross-border
deals in the U.S. market because unlike the U.S., many other countries around
the world have government restrictions prohibiting majority ownership of do-
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mestic companies by foreign acquirers in a number of industries. In that case,
the choice between direct entry and merger is really limited.
2.4 Cross-industry Difference in Entry Modes
The empirical analysis focuses on two testable implications of the model. The
Þrst hypothesis concerns the cross-industry differences in the proportion of
cross-border mergers in foreign direct investments and the second one con-
cerns the differential shareholder wealth gains in domestic versus cross-border
mergers. The Þrst hypothesis states that:
Hypothesis 1 Across different industries the proportion of cross-border merg-
ers and acquisitions relative to the total foreign direct investments should be
positively related to the entry barriers and negatively related to the competi-
tiveness of each industry.
One major difficulty in analyzing the determinants of the mode of en-
try into a new market is the lack of a comprehensive dataset on Þrms direct
entry. Data on domestic Þrms direct entry into another industry is unfortu-
nately not available. However, data about foreign direct entry into the U.S.
market can be obtained although aggregate data is more comprehensive than
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individual transaction level data. To examine the effect of industry charac-
teristics on a Þrms choice of entry mode, I obtain all complete foreign direct
investment transaction data from the International Trade Commission of the
U.S. Department of Commerce. Each year during 1987-1994, complete FDI
transactions listings are arranged by primary SIC codes of the U.S. companies
owned or controlled by foreign investors. The location of foreign investors is
also available.
The International Trade Commission classiÞes all FDI into seven cate-
gories: Acquisition/Merger, Equity Increase, Joint Venture, New Plant, Plant
Expansion, Real Estate and others. In this study, I restrict attention to only
three categories (Acquisition/Merger, Joint Venture and New Plant) because
the remaining categories (Plant Expansion, Equity Increase, Real Estate and
others) do not represent new entry into a foreign market and therefore do not
involve information asymmetry. Since detailed individual transaction level
data is not available, analysis concerning the determinants of entry modes is
performed at the industry level. Each year, each industry is required to have
at least 5 transactions to be included in the analysis.
The industry characteristics used in the regression analysis of entry
mode are obtained from Compustat. When calculating industry level charac-
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teristics, I Þrst calculate each variable at the individual Þrm level then derive
the industry level measurement by calculating the median across all Þrms in
each industry. Several previous studies (see Clarke, 1989; Lamont, 1997; and
Scharfstein, 2000) show that the SIC classiÞcation is not successful in group-
ing Þrms based upon the economic markets they belong to. For example,
according to SIC codes an oil-reÞning Þrm is in a different industry from an
oil extraction Þrm, even if they are actually in related businesses. To alleviate
this problem, I instead adopt the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry group-
ings. This grouping structure also allows me to obtain meaningful number of
Þrms in each industry group. Since entry barriers can take various forms, I use
several variables as proxies for an industrys Þxed entry cost: R&D/Sales, Ad-
vertising/Sales, Selling Expenses/Sales, and Capital Expenditure/PPE. First,
since research and development expenses can be a substantial portion of Þxed
costs and can create entry barrier through patents, it is relatively hard for a
foreign Þrm to enter industries that engage heavily in R&D. Second, a high
level of product differentiation also represents entry barriers because it gives
established Þrms an advantage over future entrants. Therefore, advertising and
selling expenses can help explain the Þxed entry cost. Third, large amount of
capital expenditure can deter Þrms from entering a market especially when
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the entrant is not a deep-pocket one. Note that these variables are not equally
important measures for each industry. For example, R&D would be more im-
portant for pharmaceutical companies while advertising or selling expenses, on
the other hand, would proxy the entry barrier better for the beverage industry
or those industries where brand names are important.
According to the models prediction, the less competitive the market
is, the more seriously direct entry by other Þrms will hurt existing Þrms and
therefore the more likely target Þrms will accept merger offers. Thus, the pro-
portion of mergers over all FDI activities in each industry should be decreasing
with the level of competition. Since it is often believed that the more an indus-
try is concentrated, the less competitive it is, I thus use the HerÞndahl index
as the proxy for the level of competition. Each year I calculate a sales-based





where Si is Þrm is share of total industry sales.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of foreign direct investment
in the U.S. during 1987 and 1994. The importance of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions as a form of foreign Þrms entry strategy is clearly illustrated
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in that they continuously account for more than 53% of the overall foreign
direct investment during the sample period. Panel B provides the Pearson
correlation matrix for those variables that proxy for the Þxed entry cost and
the level of competition. Not surprisingly, R&D expenses have a correlation
of as high as 0.606 with selling expenses because according to Compustat for
some companies R&D expenses are included in selling expenses.
Table 2 tests the models predictions about the determinants of entry
modes across different industries. According to the model, the proportion of
mergers in foreign direct investment should be positively related to proxies for
entry barriers and negatively related to the competitiveness of each industry.
For each year from 1987 to 1994 and for each industry, I calculate the
ratio of the total number of mergers and acquisitions relative to the total num-
ber of direct entry. I regress the log of this ratio on previous years measures of
the Þxed entry cost and the level of competition and several control variables.
To account for the potential autocorrelation of merger activities across dif-
ferent years and the heteroskedasticity across different industries, t-statistics
of the coefficients are calculated based upon the Newey-West autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
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In Table 2, R&D/Sales, Advertising/Sales, Selling Expenses/Sales, and
Capital Expenditure/PPE are used to measure the Þxed entry cost while sales
based HerÞndahl index proxies for the level of competition. Since these four
proxies for the Þxed entry cost are likely to capture different aspects of entry
barriers in different industries, I run regressions with each proxy separately
and with all proxies included. When including all proxies in one regression,
I leave out selling expenses because they are highly correlated with R&D ex-
penses. It has been observed that mergers in the drug, chemical, auto, oil,
and electronics industries are strongly driven by technological reasons. For ex-
ample, a technologically superior foreign company may exploit its advantage
by expanding into another market. Alternatively, a technologically inferior
company may attempt to obtain advanced technology by acquiring another
company to remain viable in the global market. Therefore, I assign a dummy
variable to each of these Þve industries to control for the possibility that it is
the technological shocks, rather than the Þxed entry cost or the level of com-
petition, that may be driving the results. Another confounding factor is the
existence of merger clustering during the sample period. Due to these merger
waves, changes in the ratio of mergers to direct entry over years may merely
capture merger activities in general rather than variations in Þxed entry costs
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or industry concentration. This possibility is illustrated in Figure C.1, where
the ratio of mergers to other forms of foreign direct investment appears to be
moving together with the change in overall merger and acquisition activities.
To account for the potential impact of merger waves, I assign a year dummy
to each industry year.
As shown in Table 2, the ratio of mergers to direct entry is positively
related to those variables that proxy for Þxed entry costs (R&D/Sales, Adver-
tising/Sales, Selling Expenses/Sales, and Capital Expenditure/PPE). Among
these four proxies, the frequency of mergers as the mode of entry seems to be
most sensitive to the advertising expenses. This suggests that customer loyalty
can be an important form of entry barrier in many industries. As predicted
by the model, the frequency of mergers is decreasing with the competitiveness
of the market indirectly measured by the HerÞndahl Index. When putting
R&D/Sales, Advertising/Sales, Capital Expenditure/PPE and the HerÞndahl
Index together in one regression, most of them remain signiÞcant. Therefore,
the Þndings in Table 2 provide strong support to the role of industry charac-
teristics in determining foreign Þrms entry mode.
Since the dependent variable is a truncated variable, I use a probit
regression to re-examine the relation between entry modes and industry char-
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acteristics in Table 3. In the probit model, the dependent variable is replaced
by the proportion of mergers in total foreign direct investment. As can been
seen in Table 3, the results obtained in Table 2 are not sensitive to different
model speciÞcations.
Though not shown in the paper, I also repeat Table 2 and Table 3 with
the total dollar value of mergers relative to the total dollar value of foreign
direct investments to make sure that the cross-border merger is indeed an
economically signiÞcant mode of foreign entry. The results are not materially
different. In summary, foreign Þrms entry strategies are strongly inßuenced
by industry characteristics such as the Þxed entry cost and the level of com-
petition.
2.5 Empirical Analysis on Announcement Ab-
normal Returns
Although the last section provides evidence in support of the prediction re-
garding the cross-industry differences in the mode of entry of foreign investors,
the result can potentially be consistent with other explanations. Suppose in
absence of asymmetric information, there is a unique cost associated with
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merger, for instance, the friction between target and bidder managements,
Þrms are still more likely to enter a new market directly when the Þxed entry
cost is small relative to the cost of merger. Therefore, it is not totally clear
how important asymmetric information is in affecting Þrms equilibrium entry
strategy. To further examine the role of asymmetric information, I test the
second hypothesis regarding the information content of merger announcements
under asymmetric information:
Hypothesis 2 Compared with domestic cross-industry mergers and acquisi-
tions, acquirers(targets) in cross-border deals should experience larger wealth
losses(gains). The differences are more prominent when acquirers are entering
those industries that are more competitive or have smaller Þxed entry costs.
To conduct analysis on the implication of the this hypothesis, I examine
the wealth effect of merger announcements on bidders and targets in domestic
versus cross-border deals. For the period of 1981 to 1998 I obtain all complete
and public disclosed value mergers and acquisitions from the SDC Mergers and
Acquisitions database. Some deals are dropped because an acquirer announced
multiple acquisitions or a Þrm was recorded as the target in multiple deals on
the same day. I make two further requirements on deal values and bidders
ownership of the combined Þrms because inclusion of small deals only adds
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noise to the analysis. Thus, each deal must have a transaction value of at least
$1 million and the bidder must control at least 40% of the post merger Þrm
to be included in the analysis. In order to calculate announcement abnormal
returns, targets and bidders are also required to be publicly traded companies
with stock return data available from CRSP or Datastream International. The
market index return employed is the CRSP equally-weighted index for the U.S.
market and Datastream Country Index return for other countries. Returns
denoted in foreign currency are converted into U.S. dollars. I exclude those
transactions where targets are in either public utility or Þnancial industries.
Table 4 provides an overview of the time series and geographic distri-
bution of the merger activities included in the announcement abnormal return
analysis. Consistent with previous evidences concerning merger activities in
the U.S., the table indicates two major merger waves in the past two decades.
One ran from 1983 to 1989 and the other one from 1994 to 1998. This ob-
servation conÞrms the importance of controlling for merger clustering when
examining any changes in the number of mergers and acquisitions over time in
the previous section. Another feature of the sample is that there is a slightly
higher portion of within industry mergers and acquisitions than cross indus-
try deals in both domestic and cross-border samples during most of the years
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according to the Fama-French 48 industry groups that targets and bidders
belong to. Not surprisingly, the country breakdown shows that Japan, UK
and Canada are three major foreign players in the U.S. merger and acquisi-
tion market, which together account for more than 55% of all the cross-border
takeovers.
Since this study seeks to explain how asymmetric information affects
the equilibrium mode by which a Þrm enters a new market and the signaling
effect of the entry mode, I focus on the comparison between two types of en-
tries: domestic entry into another industry and cross-border entry into another
country (whether within or across industries). A comparison of deal charac-
teristics for these two types of mergers is presented in Table 5. Two related
features of cross-border deals are apparent. First, signiÞcantly more cross-
borders deals than domestic cross-industry deals use cash as the only means
of payment. Second, more foreign bidders obtain corporate control through
tender offers. However, with the rapid globalization in the 1990s and the
growing acceptance of foreign Þrms stocks by U.S. investors, the proportion
of cross-border deals paid with cash decreases over time. At the same time,
the soaring U.S. stock market also encouraged the use of stock as a method of
payment in both domestic and cross-border transaction in the 1990s. Another
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factor behind this change in the method of payment is the Tax Act of 1986
which provided acquiring Þrms with less incentive to make cash offers. There
is no signiÞcant difference in the proportion of resisted offers or offers involving
multiple bidders between domestic and cross-border mergers.
2.5.1 Unconditional Abnormal Returns
According to the models predictions, the bidders are revealed to have low
efficiency through the takeover announcement. Thus, the bidder should expe-
rience a negative stock response. On the other hand, the merger announcement
appears to be good news for the target Þrm because the entrant will enter via
takeover and the threat of direct entry to its current proÞtability is resolved.
As a result, target shareholders should experience wealth gains. One way to
test this hypothesis is to compare wealth effects of mergers on target and bidder
shareholders in domestic cross-industry mergers versus cross-border mergers
because the latter involves more severe information asymmetry.
To assess these wealth effects, I calculate the abnormal return around
the merger announcement dates. For each announcement date, I calculate the
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abnormal returns for company i using the market model:
ARit = Rit − exp(Rit) = Rit − bαi − bβi ∗Rmt
where Rmt is the market index. bαi and bβi are estimated using daily stock
returns of company i during the period of (-240, -41) before the takeover
announcement. For a 7-day event window (-3, +3) around the announcement







Rit − bαi − bβi ∗Rmt
Panel A of Table 6 shows the abnormal returns on the target company
stocks during the period of 3 days before and 3 days after the merger an-
nouncement and the 7-day cumulative abnormal returns around the event day.
Consistent with the models prediction, around the event day, the average ab-
normal returns for targets in cross-border mergers are signiÞcantly larger than
those for targets in domestic mergers. In fact, on the announcement day itself,
the takeover premium earned by target companies of foreign buyers is signif-
icantly larger than that earned by targets of domestic buyers by more than
3%. The 7-day cumulative abnormal returns also support the hypothesis that
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target shareholder wealth gains are higher when buyers are foreign companies.
Across the 7 days, targets of foreign companies earn almost 5% more than
targets of domestic Þrms in a different industry.
To test whether differences in wealth gains (losses) to acquiring Þrms in
domestic and foreign acquisitions are also consistent with the models predic-
tion, I calculate daily abnormal returns of bidders for the same event window of
(-3, +3). The results are shown in panel B. Consistent with previous evidences,
acquiring Þrms abnormal returns are much smaller than those of the target
Þrms. More importantly, foreign bidders wealth gains are close to zero while
domestic bidders earn signiÞcantly positive, though small, abnormal returns
upon takeover announcements. This Þnding is also in line with the Eckbo and
Thorburn (2000) evidence from takeovers of Canadian Þrms in which domes-
tic bidders earn signiÞcantly positive average announcement abnormal returns,
but foreign (U.S.) bidders abnormal returns are indistinguishable from zero.
2.5.2 Conditional Abnormal Returns
The abnormal returns calculated in the previous section are unconditional.
Previous studies suggest that deal characteristics can inßuence these returns.
Since Table 5 indicates that domestic and cross-border mergers have signiÞ-
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cantly different characteristics, I run the followingWeighted Least Square(WLS)
regression to determine whether different degrees of information asymmetry
or other factors are explaining the differences in abnormal returns between the
cross-border and domestic mergers:
CARi(−3,3) = a0+α1 ∗Cross− border+α2 ∗Cross− ind+α3 ∗Cash+
α4 ∗Hostile+α5 ∗Compete+α6 ∗Take100%+α7 ∗Cross ∗FX+a8 ∗Cross∗
Stock + a9 ∗ Si ze+ a10 ∗ Tax81+ a11 ∗WWtax+ a12 ∗ Advisor
To control for potential heteroskedasticity, weights in the regressions
are equal to the standard deviation of the market model residuals. CAR is
the bidder or target cumulative abnormal return for the event window of (-3,
+3). Cross-border, Cross-ind, Cash, Hostile and Compete are dummy vari-
ables set to 1 for deals that are cross-border, cross-industry, pure cash offers,
hostile takeovers, or involve more than one bidder respectively. Take100% is
a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer controls 100% of the target
after mergers. Cross*FX is deÞned as the interaction between the cross-border
dummy and the quarterly percentage deviation of the U.S. real trade-weighted
average dollar exchange rate index from its average in the sample period. It is
matched to each deal according to the deal announcement date.5 Cross*Stock
5The dollar exchange rate index used here is the real trade-weighted average of foreign
exchange values of the U.S. dollars against major currencies released by the Fedeal Reserve
Board. An increase in this value indicates dollar appreciation.
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is a binary variable used to indicate those foreign mergers completed partially
or entirely with stocks. Size measures the relative sizes of the deal and the
bidding Þrm with the logged ratio of the deal value to the bidding Þrms mar-
ket capitalization as of three months before the merger announcement. Tax81
and WWtax are dummy variables indicating whether the takeover occurred
during 1981 and 1986 when the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act was in ef-
fect and whether the foreign buyers were from either U.K. or Japan during
that period. Since U.K. and Japan are Worldwide tax regime countries with
different corporate tax rates than the U.S., WWtax can help identify whether
the 1981 ERTA gave U.S. buyers any advantage over foreign buyers from the
Worldwide tax regime. Finally, Advisor indicates those transactions where the
target Þrm has a top investment bank as its Þnancial advisor.6
Recently a large literature has documented that diversiÞed Þrms are
valued at a discount relative to comparable portfolios of stand-alone Þrms. Po-
tential explanations include managerial agency problem, cross subsidization,
and mispricing by investors (see Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Scharf-
6Although the reputation of investment banks is a subjective issue, the ranking of top
investment banks is actually quite stable given the rigid hierarchy in this industry. Top
investment banks include Salomon Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch Capital
Management, J.P. Morgan, Credit Suisse First Boston, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs,
Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns & Co., Deutsche Bank AG, UBS and Paine Webber or their
predecessors before consolidations according to the Bloomberg Underwriter Rankings for
U.S. corporate deals in recent years.
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stein,1998; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000; Lamont and Polk, 2000). It is
possible that some bidders experience lower wealth gains than others because
they are conducting a diversifying merger. Although this is unlikely to be
driving the result here because the domestic sample includes cross-industry
deals only while the foreign sample contains both within industry and cross-
industry deals, I still include a dummy for all cross-industry deals. Again,
in the regression analysis I adopt the Fama-French 48 industry classiÞcation
when determining whether a deal is cross industry or not.
Huang and Walking (1987) and Travlos (1987) suggest that the method
of payment has a very powerful inßuence on the takeover premium. SpeciÞ-
cally, cash offers generally bring higher abnormal returns than do stock offers
to both the targets and the bidding Þrms. Since Table 5 shows that a signiÞ-
cantly larger portion of cross-border deals than domestic deals are cash offers,
the Cash dummy is included to control for the possibility that the higher
abnormal returns earned by the targets of foreign buyers are driven by the
fact that more cross-border deals are completed through cash offers. Huang
and Walking (1987) also Þnd that managerial resistance can bring higher tar-
get takeover premium although the results are not statistically signiÞcant.
Dewenter (1995) provides weak evidence that managerial efforts to delay or
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block the bid can raise the target takeover premium. Table 5 does not show a
signiÞcant difference between percentages of hostile takeovers in the domestic
versus the foreign deals. However, the characteristic of the hostile takeovers
may differ across the two sub-samples. Thus, I include the Hostile dummy
to allow for a difference. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) Þnd that cumula-
tive abnormal returns are higher for targets and lower for bidders when there
are rival bidders. I thus include a dummy for deals with competing bids be-
cause Table 5 shows that signiÞcantly more cross-border mergers are contested
than domestic mergers in the 1980s. A dummy variable Take100% indicating
full takeovers is also added since Dewenter (1995) Þnds that target takeover
premium is higher when the bidder acquires 100% ownership of the target, .
Foreign bidders are able to pay more when exchange rates move to their
advantage. As a result, the depreciation of the dollar facilitates takeovers of
U.S. Þrms by foreign bidders. Since the 1980s are characterized by dramatic
movements of the dollar, the variable Cross*FX is added to control for the
effect of exchange rate on the takeover premium. When analyzing the differ-
ences in bidding Þrmss stock returns, I include an additional interaction term
between the cross-border dummy and the dummy variable indicating whether
stocks are used for part of or all of the purchase. Although current litera-
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ture on domestic mergers suggests that a takeover through equity signals that
the bidding Þrm is overvalued, the information content of a stock offer could
be different when the bidder is a foreign company because it is required to
disclose more information if its equity is involved. In fact, the willingness of
the target shareholders to accept the foreign bidders stocks sends a strong
positive message to the market about the bidders. Therefore, the expected
sign on Cross*Stock is positive. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) Þnd that acquirer
abnormal returns decrease with the size of the acquirer relative to that of the
target. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) also provide evidence that the smaller size
of the Canadian bidders helps explain their superior performance compared
with that of U.S. acquirers. Therefore, I include the logged ratio of the deal
value relative to the size of the acquirer to capture the attenuation effect.
Given U.S. tax law changes during the sample period and their conse-
quences on acquisitions across time and across acquirers from different coun-
tries, Tax81 andWWtax are two dummy variables used to control for the effect
of taxes on takeover premiums. Measures such as accelerated depreciation and
investment tax credit under the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act made merg-
ers more attractive to Þrms. Therefore, Tax81 takes on the value of one if a
deal is announced between 1981 and 1986. However, whether the differential
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corporate tax rates between the U.S. and foreign countries can affect the rel-
ative level of takeover premia received by targets of foreign versus domestic
buyers depends on whether foreign buyers are from Worldwide Tax countries
where repatriated earnings are taxed at home.7 According to the Scholes and
Wolfson (1990) tax story, the 1981 Tax Act should have favored U.S. buyers
against foreign buyers from the Worldwide tax regime. Therefore, WWtax is
expected to be negative if tax incentives are linked to takeover premiums.
One unique role of Þnancial advisors is the reduction of information
asymmetry in the merger process. We expect the information asymmetry
problem to be less severe if target Þrms get advice from top investment banks.
However, the sign on the dummy variable Advisor is unclear because experi-
enced Þnancial advisors can also help target Þrms reap more gains from the
transaction at the cost of acquiring Þrms.
As can be seen from Table 7, after controlling for these potentially con-
founding factors from the deal characteristics, targets of foreign buyers on
average still earn signiÞcantly larger takeover premiums than do targets of
domestic buyersa result that is supportive of the effect of increased infor-
mation asymmetry in cross-border mergers. Although stock prices seem to
7See Scholes and Wolfson (1990) and Dewenter (1995) for more detailed discussion on the
differential tax consequences of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act on U.S. and foreign
Þrms.
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react more negatively to acquiring Þrms engaging in cross-industry mergers,
the cross-industry dummy is not signiÞcant. I also Þnd that average cumula-
tive abnormal returns to targets are higher in all-cash and in hostile takeovers
and when acquirers hold 100% ownership of the combined Þrms. These results
are consistent with Jensen and Ruback (1983), Huang and Walking (1987),
Servaes (1991) and several other studies on domestic mergers. Surprisingly,
targets earn signiÞcantly less in mergers with rival bidders. This contradicts
evidences in studies on domestic mergers such as Bradley, Desai, and Kim
(1998) but concurs with one of the most puzzling results in the Dewenter (1995)
study of market reactions to domestic and foreign takeover announcements in
U.S. chemical and retail industries. Consistent with Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991), I Þnd that the strength of foreign currencies relative to the U.S. dollar
signiÞcantly affects the takeover premium earned by targets of foreign bidders.
On the other hand, in addition to differences in bidder gains that can be
attributed to differences in deal characteristics, foreign bidders appear to ex-
perience signiÞcantly larger wealth losses around merger announcement dates
than do domestic bidders. Unlike the target takeover premium, abnormal re-
turns to bidders do not seem to be signiÞcantly related to either the existence
of rival bidders or the acquirers ownership of the merged Þrm. The negative
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sign on Hostile is consistent with the view that target Þrms gain in hostile
takeovers at the expense of acquirers. Similarly, while Take100% is signiÞ-
cantly positive in the target regression, it takes on a signiÞcantly negative sign
in the bidder regression.
Interestingly, however, foreign bidders that pay part of or the entirety
of the transactions with their equity appear to experience 1.48% larger wealth
gains. This observation is in sharp contrast to previous evidence of cash pre-
mium in domestic mergers.8 It suggests that the method of payment has a
unique signalling effect in cross-border mergers. On the one hand, the accep-
tance of foreign stocks by U.S. targets serves as a positive signal about the
value of foreign bidders. On the other hand, companies that use equity to
complete the merger are forced to disclose more information and are subject
to more stringent regulatory scrutiny. Therefore, the asymmetric information
associated with these Þrms will be less severe. In that case, since the merger
announcement is a less negative signal about the them, they should realize
larger wealth gains.
Although the signiÞcantly positive sign on Size suggests that the impact
of the merger on acquirers tends to be more pronounced when the acquired
8Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) also Þnd that Canadian bidder announcement returns are
on average greatest for offers involving equity payment. But their Þnding is speciÞc to
domestic mergers in the Canadian corporate control market.
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assets are more signiÞcant relative to their premerger assets, the magnitude of
the coefficient is rather small and cannot fully account for differences in wealth
gains realized by domestic versus foreign bidders. Again, consistent with Harris
and Ravenscraft (1991) and Dewenter (1995), I do not Þnd tax incentives to
have any explanatory power on the takeover premium. Rather, the negative
coefficient on Tax81 in the target and bidder regressions may merely reßect
the lower premium earned by Þrms in general in the 1980s relative to the
1990s.9 Finally, there is no clear evidence that the reputation of the target
Þrms Þnancial advisor is related to the level of information asymmetry in the
merger process.
2.6 Effects of Industry Characteristics on the
Differences in Abnormal Returns
In the previous section, I provide evidence that signiÞcant differences exist
between domestic and cross-border deals in terms of target and bidder takeover
wealth gains. However, it is hard to conclusively claim that these differences
are due to asymmetric information because asymmetric information results in
9Replacing the Tax81 dummy by a dummy variable indicating deals taking place in the
1980s also yields signiÞcantly negative sign.
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the separating equilibrium only if the Þxed entry cost is not too high or the
market is very competitive. This is because the smaller the Þxed entry cost is,
the less attractive merger is to the high efficiency entrants. They are then less
willing to pool with the low efficiency entrants. Similarly, the more competitive
the market is, the less likely the target is to take the risk of accepting a low
bid from a potential low efficiency entrant. Thus, merger offers from high
efficiency bidders have a larger likelihood of being rejected. This suggests that
the differences in target and bidder takeover premium between domestic and
cross-border mergers should be more pronounced when the bidding Þrm is
entering an industry that is highly competitive or has relatively small Þxed
entry cost. In order to show that it is asymmetric information that is driving
the differences documented in last section, I further investigate the cause of
these differences by examining the cross-sectional determinants of the impact
of asymmetric information on differential announcement abnormal returns in
domestic versus cross-border mergers.
As discussed in section ??, I use the industry R&D expenditure to
proxy for the Þxed entry cost and the HerÞndahl index to proxy for the com-
petitiveness of the market. Previous years industry median R&D/Sales and
HerÞndahl index are matched to each deal according to the Fama-French 48
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industry groups that the target Þrm belongs to and the deal date. Acquisitions
in industries where the R&D/Sales is below the median level of all industries
in the sample are classiÞed as entries into markets with low Þxed entry cost.
According to the guidelines issued by U.S. Department of Justice for evaluat-
ing mergers, acquisitions in industries with HerÞndahl index less than 0.18 are
considered as entries into relatively competitive markets.
In Table 8, deals are divided into two groups by the level of entry cost
and market competition. The coefficient on the cross-border dummy indicates
that differences in target and bidder abnormal returns between domestic and
cross-border mergers become more signiÞcant when mergers take place in mar-
kets with relatively low level of Þxed entry cost or high level of competition.
SpeciÞcally, for those deals with target industry R&D/Sales below the median
level or with HerÞndahl index smaller than 0.18, targets of foreign buyers earn
7.66% more than do targets of domestic buyers. On the other hand, foreign
buyers lose 1.77% more. However, when entrants are entering industries with
high Þxed entry cost or low level of competition, the differences are much
smaller and no longer signiÞcant. This evidence is consistent with the models
prediction about the source of differences in announcement abnormal returns
between domestic and cross-border mergers. It provides strong support for the
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hypothesis that asymmetric information and Þxed entry cost together deter-
mine foreign Þrms mode of entry and the resulting differences in wealth effects
between these two types of mergers. More importantly, the cross-sectional
variation in the differences between domestic and foreign takeover premiums
clearly distinguish the information asymmetry hypothesis from other alterna-
tive explanations.
The cross-industry analysis and event study provided in the above
two chapters suggest that the differences between domestic and cross-border
takeovers in terms of targets and bidders wealth gains can be explained by the
information asymmetry involved in cross-border transactions. Due to infor-
mation asymmetry, high quality Þrms must pay a premium relative to their
offer prices under symmetric information if they want to enter by taking over
existing Þrms and avoid the Þxed entry cost associated with greenÞeld invest-
ments. They will do that only when the entry barrier is too costly. On the
other hand, existing Þrms, being the uninformed party, want to protect them-
selves by asking for a high takeover price. But at the same time they are also
running the risk of rejecting high quality bidders. The lower is the level of
competition in the market, the more severely existing Þrms will be hurt by
the direct entry of high quality Þrms. Therefore, Þrst, merger is more likely
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to be the mode of entry when the Þxed entry cost is high and when the level
of competition in an industry is low. Second, differences in target and bid-
der takeover premium between cross-border and domestic mergers come from
those deals in industries with low Þxed entry cost or low level of competition.
2.7 Evidence from Related Mergers
In both domestic and cross-border mergers, many involve cross-industry com-
binations according to the primary SIC codes of the targets and bidders. The-
oretically, the models implication applies to both related and conglomerate
mergers. Empirically, when a Þrm is entering a market that is unrelated to its
current business, it is unlikely that it has the capacity to establish its own busi-
ness in the new market. In other words, the choice between direct entry and
takeover is very limited in that case. If this is true, then there is actually less
uncertainty about the mode of entry or the efficiency of entrant. To conduct
a test that best illustrates how asymmetric information causes the market to
react to domestic and cross-border mergers differently, in this section I restrict
the sample to related mergers.
Examining a sub-sample of related mergers also allows for more power-
ful tests on the effect of asymmetric information. Since cross-industry mergers
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and cross-border mergers are two different types of market entry, it is hard to
quantify which one involves more severe information asymmetry because the
cross-border merger sample consists of both within industry and cross-industry
deals. However, by examining domestic and cross-border related mergers only,
I resolve the problem regarding the relative importance of information asym-
metry in cross-industry and cross-border takeovers.
Although in the previous regressions I have controlled for the effect of
diversifying mergers by including a cross-industry dummy, one can still ar-
gue that the results are entangled with the diversiÞcation discount because
comparing the primary industry groups that the targets and acquirers belong
to cannot identify related businesses represented by different segments of the
Þrms. Although the domestic sample includes more deals between targets and
bidders from different industries according to their primary business segments,
it is possible that the cross-border sample actually has more diversifying merg-
ers if we examine all of Þrms business segments rather than just their core
segments. If that were the case, one would also expect to see lower bidder
abnormal returns in cross-border deals. Thus, restricting the analysis to re-
lated mergers also help disentangle the diversiÞcation discount from the effect
of asymmetric information.
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Therefore, in this section I remove the conglomerate mergers from my
sample and conduct a separate analysis on related mergers. Following Chave-
lier (2000), I pull out all reported four-digit SIC codes of both acquirers and
targets in each deal and convert them to the Fama-French 48 industry group-
ings.10 I then deÞne a diversifying merger as one in which the bidder has no
business segments in common with the primary business of the target at the
Fama-French 48 industry level. Since I am examining non-diversifying mergers
that represent entry into another market, for domestic mergers I only include
those that involve parties with different primary business segments but are not
classiÞed as diversifying mergers. This screening procedure on relatedness is
performed for both domestic and cross-border deals.
Tables 9 and 10 repeat the analyses in section 2.5 for related mergers
only. Regarding wealth effects of mergers on targets and acquirers, the results
are consistent with those involving the full sample. Compared with domestic
mergers, targets in cross-border deals experience higher abnormal returns while
foreign bidders suffer larger wealth loss after controlling for deal characteristics,
exchange rate movement and different tax regimes. Again, these differences
are mainly driven by those deals where the bidders enter markets with low
10SDC reports up to 10 SIC codes for each multi-segment Þrm.
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Þxed entry cost and high level of competition. Although the magnitude of the
coefficient on the cross-border dummy is slightly smaller in the target abnormal
returns regression and slightly larger in the bidder regression, the results shown
in Tables 6 through 8 are not qualitatively different if conglomerate mergers
are excluded.
2.8 Effects of Varying Degrees of Information
Asymmetry
2.8.1 Industry Analysis
In chapters 2.5 and 2.7, I compare domestic deals with cross-border ones be-
cause cross-border mergers are generally conducted in an environment char-
acterized by more severe information asymmetry between buyers and targets.
However, depending on where the merger transaction takes place, the level of
information asymmetry should be different across product markets. For exam-
ple, we expect the production of consumer goods to be fairly standard around
the world and the information asymmetry to be a less important problem in
mergers involving those products. In contrast, the difference in information
asymmetry between domestic and cross-border mergers will be much more sig-
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niÞcant in hi-tech industries because the nature of the business making it more
difficult to assert a Þrms potential proÞtability in a new market. Therefore,
it will be interesting to examine if the differences in takeover premiums be-
tween domestic and cross-border mergers vary with the degree of information
asymmetry.
In Table 11, I focus on the sub-sample of mergers where the targets
primary business falls into any of the following industries: medical equipment,
drugs, chemicals, electrical equipment, automobiles, aerospace, telecommuni-
cation, computers, chips and the software industries. Since mergers in these
markets should feature more severe information asymmetry, we should expect
to see larger differences in takeover premium between domestic and cross-
border mergers. One complication of this analysis is that these industries are
usually associated with high entry barriers as well since they are businesses
with high R&D and selling expenses. This means the overall differences in
takeover premiums as a result of information asymmetry should be less promi-
nent in this sub-sample. To better illustrate the effect of information asym-
metry, I again group the sample into two categories according to the level of
entry cost and market competition in the target market.
Similar to what I Þnd in Table 8, the cross-border dummy is signiÞ-
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cantly positive in the target regression and signiÞcantly negative in the bidder
regression for mergers that take place in industries with low R&D expenses
and high level of competition. Furthermore, the differences in target and bid-
der takeover premium between domestic and foreign mergers are much larger
for this sub-sample of mergers that are more likely to involve the information
asymmetry problem. When the Þxed entry cost is low and the market is highly
competitive, targets of foreign buyers realize 16.25% more wealth gains while
foreign buyers earn 3.45% less after I control for all other confounding factors
from deal characteristics, potential attenuation effect, exchange rate and tax
effects. These differences in takeover premium are almost twice as much as
the numbers that are obtained from the full sample. They provide support
for the information asymmetry explanation for differential target and bidder
wealth gains in domestic and cross-border mergers.
2.8.2 Country Analysis
To provide further insight into the role of asymmetric information, I now
conduct a separate analysis on cross-border mergers. Even among foreign deals
themselves, there should still exist different degrees of information asymmetry
depending on the bidders domicile market. For example, if a U.S. target Þrm
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is negotiating a deal with a Canadian Þrm, given the small differences between
the two countries, the target Þrm will most likely treat the offer the same as it
would treat an offer from an otherwise identical U.S. Þrm. On the other hand,
if the bidder is a Þrm from a country such as Singapore, which is culturally
very different from the U.S., has different accounting standards and does not
have such close business ties with the U.S. market, then the value of the bidder
would be less transparent to the target. Therefore, if information asymmetry
is driving the differences in target and bidder wealth gains, one should expect
to see its effects vary across deals involving bidders from different foreign
countries.
As a robustness check, in this section I examine the effects of differ-
ent degrees of the information asymmetry on target and bidder wealth gains
by focusing on cross-border mergers. Table 12 regresses the cumulative 7-
day announcement abnormal returns for targets and bidders against a country
group dummy and other controlling variables used in previous analyses. Un-
like analyses in chapters 2.5 and 2.7, the foreign exchange movement and the
dummy variable indicating equity offers are not interacted with the cross-
border dummy because only foreign mergers are included here. I classify all
cross-border deals into two categories: one in which the bidding Þrms are from
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either Canada or UK and the other one involving bidders from the rest of the
world. The Other Countries dummy is set equal to one for those deals where
the bidders are not from those two countries which have the smallest economic
and cultural differences from the U.S. As expected, the effect of information
asymmetry is more signiÞcant when bidders are from other countries. This
is reßected by the signiÞcantly positive coefficient on the Other Countries
dummy in the target abnormal returns regression and the signiÞcantly nega-
tive coefficient on it in the bidder regression. The results in Table 12 suggest
that compared with deals involving UK or Canada, targets in deals involving
other foreign countries that are less integrated with the U.S. market experience
larger wealth gains while bidders in those deals suffer larger wealth losses due
to the higher degree of information asymmetry involved.
2.9 Summary of Chapter 2
In this study, I examine the differences between domestic and cross-border
merger and acquisition from a new perspective. Some previous evidences doc-
ument that the stock market reacts to domestic and cross-border mergers
differently. These differences cannot be explained by differences in either deal
characteristics, or the impact of exchange rate movement, or tax law changes.
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Other studies, however, provide evidence that the foreign premium received
by U.S. targets does not hold uniformly across all industries.
Compared with domestic deals, cross-border transactions generally in-
volve greater asymmetric information between targets and acquirers. To focus
on this feature, I motivate my empirical analysis with a model that character-
izes the effect of information asymmetry regarding the bidders efficiency on
their entry decisions. Given a Þxed entry cost associated with direct entry,
entrants should always choose to merge with an existing Þrm regardless of
their efficiency types in absence of asymmetric information. However, when
the type of the entrant is unknown to the target Þrm, the high efficiency bid-
der enters directly while the low efficiency one enters via a merger if the Þxed
entry cost is below a certain level or if the market is very competitive. In
equilibrium, the takeover announcement conveys favorable information about
the existing Þrm and unfavorable information about the bidder in the presence
of asymmetric information.
Assuming more severe information asymmetry exists in cross-border
mergers, I examine when foreign Þrms choose to enter the U.S. market through
cross-border mergers and compare the wealth effect of cross-border mergers
with that of domestic ones. Using a dataset of foreign direct investment in
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the U.S., I Þnd that acquisitions will more likely be foreign Þrms entry mode
into those industries that are less competitive or involve higher Þxed entry cost.
To investigate whether the market reacts to domestic and cross-border mergers
differently due to the different degrees of information asymmetry, I calculate
takeover premia to targets and bidders in two types of market entry: domestic
cross-industry deals and cross-border deals. First, I Þnd that in cross-border
mergers the target earn signiÞcantly higher premium and the bidder earn sig-
niÞcantly lower premiums around the announcement period as compared to
domestic deals. Furthermore, I Þnd that these differences in announcement
abnormal returns are mainly driven by those deals that represent entries into
industries with low level of Þxed entry cost and high level of competition, a
result that is in support of the information asymmetry hypothesis. Restricting
the sample to related mergers does not change the results. Finally, I show that
the announcement abnormal returns for targets and bidders vary across indus-
tries and foreign countries with differing degrees of information asymmetry in




Exchange Exposure of U.S.
Firms
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 3
The increasing globalization of product and Þnancial markets means that many
Þrms are now exposed to changes in the values of currencies. These changes can
have a dramatic effect over a short period of time. For example, in the fall of
1999, Sony announced that its proÞts were down 25% because the appreciation
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of the yen affected their foreign sales (Landers, 1999). More recently, the fall
of Xeroxs credit rating from investment grade to speculative grade restricted
its access to credit and its ability to hedge foreign exchange risk, resulting
in larger losses than expected for 2001. A Þrms exchange rate exposure can
come from direct exposure, such as that faced by Sony and Xerox in their
foreign sales, or it can come from indirect exposure, such as when a Þrm has
a foreign competitor. Even a Þrm with only domestic competitors and no
foreign operations or sales could be subject to foreign exchange exposure if a
party with which it has a business relationship, say, its supplier, is exposed to
exchange rate risk.
Despite this complexity, Þnancial economists have attempted for some
time to measure the extent of corporate exposure to exchange rate changes.
Currently, most theoretical examinations of the currency risk have focused on
the impact of exchange rate ßuctuation on Þrms cash ßow volatility. (See,
for example, Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984; and Froot, Sharfstein, and
Stein, 1993.) Because it is difficult to observe a Þrms cash ßows, following
Adler and Dumas (1984), the standard empirical research design has become
estimating currency exposure by regressing stock returns on the percentage
change in exchange rates. However, by taking this approach so far empirical
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studies have found very low proportion of U.S. Þrms having signiÞcant expo-
sure. (See, for example, Jorion, 1990; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; and Amihud,
1994; Griffin and Stulz, 2001.) Therefore, despite the widely expected impact
of currency exposure on Þrms operations, the correlations between contempo-
raneous exchange rate movements and the Þrms stock returns appear to be
very low.
Motivated by previous theoretical studies of the effect of exchange rate
on Þrms cash ßows, in this study I examine exchange rate exposure from
a different angle. I argue that since exchange rate movement affects Þrms
operation through its direct impact on Þrms short-term cash ßows, its ultimate
impact on Þrms fundamental values may vary cross-sectionally depending on
the sensitivity of their values to volatilities of short-term cash ßows. For
example, if the liquidity of a Þrm is already low, then large ßuctuation in its
cash ßows can easily push the Þrm into Þnancial distress and as a result lead
to changes in its fundamental value. Similarly, when a Þrm has substantial
growth opportunities, but limited access to external Þnancing, the effect of
exchange rate movements will be more prominent as compared to other Þrms.
This effect is due to the larger cost of underinvestment. Since exchange rate
becomes important to a Þrms fundamental value only when the resulting
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short-term ßuctuation of its cash ßow forces it into Þnancial distress or causes
it to forsake positive NPV investment opportunities, the stock price of those
Þrms that have greater expected costs of Þnancial distress should exhibit more
signiÞcant sensitivity to exchange rate movements.1 Furthermore, among Þrms
that are exposed to exchange rate risk, their exposures would be expected to
vary cross-sectionally with their expected costs of Þnancial distress in terms
of both the probability of distress and the cost of distress.
An examination on this issue will help discover the cross-sectional vari-
ation in the sensitivity of stock returns to exchange movements. It may also
help reconcile substantial evidence on the effect of exchange rate risk on Þrms
operations, but the limited evidence that shows the statistical and economic
signiÞcance from the exposure. Although exchange rate risk may increase the
volatility of Þrms cash ßows in the short term, it may not necessarily affect
their returns, which are measures of their fundamental values. This could be
the case because the Þrm is able to adjust in the longer term, for example, by
switching suppliers to a less expensive currency or because of long-run pur-
chasing power parity. However, when a Þrms short term cash ßow exposure to
exchange rates is large enough that the exposure affects its liquidity, disrupts
1Note that greater Þnancial distress costs can result in greater beneÞts if the exchange
rate goes in favor of a Þrm.
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its normal business or hurts its long run growth, the impact of exchange rate
risk will lead to changes in stock price because investors will re-evaluate the
fundamental value. That is, exchange rate changes, while having short-term
effects, may not always be relevant to Þrms over the long term.
To test the hypothesis regarding the effect of the foreign exchange risk
on Þrms values, I estimate the foreign exchange exposure of a sample of 737
U.S. manufacturing Þrms using monthly stock return data between 1977 and
2000. For a sub-sample of Þrms with analyst earnings forecasts data available, I
also examine their cash ßow exposures using monthly analyst earnings forecasts
as proxies for Þrms near term cash ßows. The relation between exchange rate
exposure and Þrms Þnancial characteristics are explored through a two-step
procedure. In our Þrst step, I examine what type of Þrm is exposed to currency
risk by comparing the Þnancial characteristics of Þrms that exhibit signiÞcant
return exposure with those of Þrms that do not. We divide the sample period
into two sub-periods because of the differences in exchange rate behavior over
those periods. The Þrst period runs from 1/1977 through 4/1988. The second
period covers 05/1998 through 12/2000. I Þnd that Þrms whose returns have
strong correlations with contemporaneous exchange rate movements generally
have high levels of short-term leverage, low liquidity as proxied by the current
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ratio, high sales, and larger R&D expenses, especially in the second period.
Moreover, in the second period, which includes the recent high-tech boom,
Þrms with larger costs of underinvestments; such as Þrms with more growth
opportunities and higher R&D and selling expenses, also show a signiÞcant
relation between their returns and exchange rate movements. In the second
step, we restrict our attention to Þrms with a signiÞcant return exposure and
we examine factors that determine the magnitude of that exposure. The results
suggest that the magnitude of exchange rate exposure is related to proxies for
Þrms availability of internal funds, probability of Þnancial distress and costs
of underinvestment.
Given the problems associated with scant information on individual
Þrms foreign business activities, I also analyze the average time and industry-
varying foreign exchange exposures at the level of 2-digit SIC industry groups
over the 1989 to 1998 period, when monthly foreign trade data are available.
By sorting Þrms into industry groups, I Þnd that 12 out of 19 U.S. manufactur-
ing industries show signiÞcant exchange rate exposures in directions consistent
with the nature of their foreign trade balances. There is evidence that the
overall exposure of U.S. manufacturing industries varies over time with their
import and export shares as predicted by the theory. Most interestingly, I
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Þnd that the overall foreign exchange exposures of U.S. Þrms are signiÞcantly
decreasing with their average liquidity and increasing with their average short-
term leverage and growth opportunities both over time and cross-sectionally-a
result that is consistent with the Þndings from individual Þrms exposures.
Although previous studies largely focus on whether there is a statisti-
cally signiÞcant relation between exchange rate movements and stock returns
over time, the economic signiÞcance of foreign exchange exposure can be bet-
ter examined during periods of extreme exchange rate changes. That is, an
examination of stock price response to large, unexpected exchange rate shocks
can provide more reliable information regarding whether exchange rate risk
has the potential to cause severe liquidity problem or affect the fundamental
value of a Þrm. An analysis that is ideal for this purpose is the event study
methodology. I examine Þrms stock price response to the largest one-day
movement (depreciation) of the U.S. dollar during the last three decadesthe
day after the announcement of the Plaza Accord in September of 1985. We fur-
ther examine whether this response is related to the Þrms short-term liquidity
positions and their costs of Þnancial distress.
We employ two measures of the stock price response to currency shocks:
the cumulative abnormal returns and the abnormal daily return volatilities
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during the event period. my result suggests that smaller Þrms, Þrms with
larger short-term leverage, lower interest coverage ratio and lower dividend
payouts show larger abnormal returns (in terms of absolute value) around the
announcement. These Þrms also experience larger increase of daily return
volatility in the 90 days surrounding the announcement from the same period
a year ago. As a robustness check, I further examine the relation between
Þrms average abnormal returns during periods of large dollar movements and
their Þnancial characteristics, the result is consistent with what I Þnd around
the Plaza Accord.
The rest of Chapter 3 proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews previous
evidences on exchange rate exposure and potential explanations for them. In
Section 3.3 I describe my sample selection process and data sources. Then
Section 3.4 reports the estimate of individual Þrms foreign exchange exposure
and analyzes the relation between foreign exchange exposure and Þrms Þnan-
cial characteristics. Section 3.5 presents results from industry level analysis.
Section 3.6 tests the cross-sectional variation of Þrms reaction to currency
shock. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes Chapter 3.
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3.2 Overview of Exchange Rate Exposure
For Þrms domiciled in the United States, current empirical studies have doc-
umented only weak correlations between exchange rate movements and Þrm
value. For example, Jorion (1990) examines 287 U.S. multinationals and Þnds
that only 5% of them have signiÞcant exposures. Although the evidence for
Þrms domiciled in other countries is somewhat stronger, it is still relatively
weak. For example, He and Ng (1998) and Glaum, Brunner and Himmel
(1998) investigate Japanese and German Þrms, respectively and Þnd more of
a relation between stock returns and exchange rate movements, but even in
these countries where presumably the large Þrms have relatively more foreign
trade than do their U.S. counterparts, the percentage of Þrms they Þnd to have
signiÞcant exposures is still less than traditional predictions would expect.
The puzzle of why U.S. Þrms show such little apparent exchange rate
exposure has not been completely explained. Exchange rate exposure certainly
has the potential to be a signiÞcant risk factor for Þrms. As pointed out
by Jorion (1990), the volatility of exchange rates is substantially larger than
that of interest rates or inßation. There are several possible explanations
for why researchers have documented such small exposures for U.S. Þrms.
First, it may be due to the offsetting nature of the exposures. Since we lack
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complete data on individual Þrms imports, exports and business competitors,
we cannot identify which Þrms are exposed to a given currency. For example,
in Browns (2001) study of the hedging practices of one U.S. Þrm, he Þnds that
the Þrm hedges 24 different currencies due to both extensive foreign sales and
the importation of a major portion of their manufacturing inputs. To mitigate
this measurement problem, I examine exchange rate exposure at the industry
level during the period of 1989-1998 when monthly imports and exports data
of U.S. manufacturing industries are available.
Second, it may be due to the complexity of the foreign exposure since
a Þrms exchange risk can be varying over time as well as cross-sectionally.
It may depend on the amount of foreign trade, the demand elasticity of the
Þrms product or the competitive reactions of other Þrms in the same industry.
Allayannis (1997), Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002) and Allayannis and
Ihrig (2001) examine time-varying exposure at the industry level. They provide
evidences that exchange rate exposures increase with the level of foreign trade
and decrease with Þrms ability to mark up the prices and pass through the
impact of exchange movements to customers. These studies indicate that it is
important to measure exposure in a speciÞcation that allows it to vary cross-
sectionally and over time. In this study, I test an additional source of variation
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by linking Þrms exchange rate exposures to their expected cost of Þnancial
distress.
A third reason for U.S. Þrms to show such little apparent exposure is
due to the rapid development of hedging instruments since the 1980s. Because
of the availability of these instruments, more Þrms are actively involved in the
management of their foreign exchange risk. A survey by Bodnar and Marston
(1998) shows that foreign currency derivatives are the most commonly used
class of derivatives. Among the surveyed Þrms that employ derivatives, 83% of
them use foreign currency derivatives. Therefore, the increasing use of hedging
techniques by Þrms along with their ability to make strategic moves more
quickly, such as changing their supply sources, means that Þrms have more
control over the degree to which currency exposure affects their operations
and values. It also means that it is difficult for researchers to measure the
true underlying exposure. Using a sample of Japanese multinational Þrms, He
and Ng (1998) show that the extent to which a Þrm is exposed to exchange
rate risk can be explained by variables that are proxies for its hedging needs,
for example, the level of Þnancial leverage, short-term liquidity position, and
the size of the Þrm. One drawback to this explanation is that according to
the Bank of International Settlements 1998 triennial survey of derivatives, the
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daily turnover for foreign exchange derivatives is only 6% of the turnover for
interest rate derivatives. Thus, despite the fact that the volatility of exchange
rate changes is substantially larger than that of interest rate changes, there is
a much smaller use of derivatives, implying that foreign exchange exposure is
smaller in magnitude than interest rate exposure. Also, the survey by Bodnar
and Marston (1998) indicates that although many Þrms engage in currency
hedging, they hedge selectively. Therefore, it is unlikely that hedging can
completely insulate Þrms from currency risk.
3.3 Sample Selection and Data Description
Between January 1977 and December 2000, I select all 2224 Þrms that have at
least 200 months of stock return data available from CRSP. Among this set of
Þrms, I exclude Þrms that do not have Þnancial information from Compustat.
I further restrict my sample to those Þrms that are likely to be affected by
foreign exchange risk. I consider the followings as indications of exchange rate
exposure: reporting pretax foreign income, paying foreign income taxes, or re-
porting foreign currency adjustment based upon information from Compustat
annual data. These restrictions reduce the number of Þrms in the sample to
1114. Since Þrms in manufacturing industries are most likely to be involved
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in foreign businesses, in this study I focus on manufacturing Þrms. Thus, my
Þnal sample contains about 737 Þrms that are likely to be affected by currency
risk.2
Each year I form 19 industry portfolios based upon Þrms 2-digit SIC
codes at the previous year end. I construct their monthly foreign trade shares
by extracting monthly values of imports and exports of U.S. manufacturing
industries against the world from the U.S. International Trade Commission.
The imports data are U.S. general imports based upon general custom values.
The total exports data are based upon FAS values. I then obtain total industry
productions as proxied by manufacturing industry shipments from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Since this data is only available on an annual basis, I
calculate the monthly import and export shares by dividing the trade data by
one-twelfth of the annual industry shipments.
To analyze Þrms cash ßow exposures and their reactions to the an-
nouncement of the Plaza Accord, I also obtain their earnings forecast data
from the I/B/E/S summary history Þle. The monthly mean analyst forecasts
for Þrms annual earnings are used as the proxy for their expected near-term
2Although this selection process is not as precise as it would be if Þrm level foreign
business data were available. However, as discussed earlier in the this study, the increasing
globalization in recent years means that companies now often have multiple sources of direct
and indirect exposure to a single currency. Therefore, my selection process may also include
Þrms that have exchange rate exposures through other channels in addition to foreign sales.
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cash ßows. To calculate their abnormal returns and volatilities in response
to the Plaza Accord and other large exchange rate movements, I collect their
daily returns and CRSP value and equally weighted index from CRSP.
The foreign exchange rate is measured as the percentage change of the
real, trade-weighted exchange rate index against major currencies. I check the
sensitivity of the tests with respect to a number of other exchange rate indices.
There are almost no differences between the results using various indices. Also,
as indicated in previous studies, the choice of a nominal or real index is not
crucial to the results since inßation is only a small component of the total
variation of the exchange rate.
3.4 The Exchange Rate Exposure of Individ-
ual Firms
3.4.1 Estimation of Exchange Rate Exposure
I begin the analysis by measuring the foreign exchange risk in a simple setting.
That is, for each of the 737 Þrms I measure their foreign exchange exposures
by regressing their monthly stock returns on the percentage change in the
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exchange rate index:
Rj,t = αj + βjR
fx
t + εj,t for t=1...T (3.1)
where Rj,t is the stock return for Þrm j at time t, and R
fx
t is the percentage
change of the exchange rate index for month t. The regression coefficient,
βj, is then the elasticity of Þrm js value to the exchange rate. Since the
trade-weighted index is deÞned as the value of foreign currency per dollar, an
increase in its value indicates that the U.S. dollar appreciates at time t. Thus,
if Þrm j has a positive βj, it means that the Þrms value increases when the
dollar appreciates.
Previous studies have also modiÞed equation (13.1) by including a mar-
ket index return, either value-weighted or equal-weighted.
Rj,t = αj + βjR
fx
t + γjVWRETt + εj,t (3.2)
Rj,t = αj + βjR
fx
t + γjEWRETt + εj,t (3.3)
In models (13.2) and (13.3), VWRETt and EWRETt are the month t returns
to the CRSP value-weighted and equal-weighted market indices respectively.
Table 13 presents the average exposure elasticity estimates for each of
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these three models. Since I cannot identify whether an individual Þrm is
a net importer or net exporter, I do not have a priori hypothesis concerning
whether the regression coefficient should be positive or negative. Consequently,
my interest is in the absolute value of the estimate. Based on model (13.1),
13.03% of the sample Þrms have either positive or negative exposure elasticities
to exchange rate risk that is signiÞcant at the 10% level. The magnitude of
the average absolute exchange rate coefficient implies that, on average, a one
percent appreciation or depreciation of the U.S. dollar would be associated
with a 0.372% change in a Þrms market value. The extremely low average R2
for these regressions implies that for these 737 Þrms, on average, changes in
the value of the trade-weighted dollar index explain very little of the change
in Þrm value.
Controlling for market returns in models (13.2) and (13.3) does not
make a signiÞcant difference on the proportion of Þrms having signiÞcant ex-
posure elasticities. In addition, not surprisingly, the average R2 is much higher
because of the explanatory power of market index returns on Þrm returns.
Consistent with the evidence provided in Bodnar and Wong (1999), model
(13.2), which uses a value-weighted index, generally detects a higher propor-
tion of Þrms with positive exposures than does model (13.3), which uses an
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equal-weighted index. On the contrary, more Þrms are found to have signiÞ-
cantly negative exposure with an equal-weighted market index. As discussed
in Bodnar and Wong (1999), this is probably due to the strong negative ex-
posure of the value-weighted market portfolio, which is dominated by large
Þrms. The implicit relation between individual Þrms total exposure and the
exposure of the market portfolio makes it difficult to assess whether a Þrm is
affected by currency risk at all. Since my interest is not in estimating Þrms
market betas but in controlling for the correlation of macroeconomic effects
with exchange rate, in this study I introduce an alternative control variable.
That is, instead of including the value-weighted or equal-weighted market re-
turn, I match Þrms with CRSP size-based deciles according to their year-end
market capitalization and control for inßuences of macroeconomic factors with
returns on the size deciles that they belong to:
Rj,t = αj + βjR
fx
t + γjDECRETt + εj,t (3.4)
where DECRETt is the return to the size decile portfolio that stock j belongs
to at time t. This method, on the one hand, helps reduce the bias in estimates
of exposure caused by strong aggregate exposures of market portfolios. On
the other hand, it reduces the residual variance of model (13.1) in the same
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way as do models (13.2) and (13.3) and thus improves the precision of the
exposure estimates. Thus, unless otherwise stated, I will use model (13.4)
to estimate foreign exchange exposure in all subsequent analyses. According
to model (13.4), about 11.13% of the sample Þrms are signiÞcantly exposed
to exchange rate risk over the whole period. This low percentage is broadly
consistent with the the evidence in previous studies.
As Figure C.2 shows, the value of the trade-weighted dollar changed
substantially over my twenty-four year sample period. A Þrms foreign ex-
change exposure depends on the amount and nature of its foreign businesses,
its market structure, the reactions of its competitor and its use of hedging
tools. Because all of these determinants of exposure are changing across time,
we would expect the Þrms exposure to be time varying. For example, if a Þrm
has monopolistic power in the international market, it will be able to pass
through the effects of exchange rate movement to the consumers and bear
no exchange rate risk. If other Þrms then later enter the market, the level
of pass-through will decrease and the Þrms foreign exchange exposure will
increase.
To test whether U.S. Þrms foreign exchange exposure shows time vari-
ation, I break the sample period into two sub-periods according to the two dif-
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ferent behaviors of exchange rate movements. The Þrst period is from 01/1977
through 04/1988, which was characterized by a persistent appreciation of the
U.S. dollar after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and sharp deval-
uation following the Plaza Accord. The second period covers 05/1988 through
12/2000 during which the U.S. dollar index exhibited volatility without any
strong trend in one direction. The estimate of exchange rate exposure for each
sub-period is shown in Table 14. As can be seen from the table, Þrms that
exhibit signiÞcant exchange rate exposures in one period do not necessarily do
so in other periods. This may have to do with changing Þrm characteristics
and competitive market condition over time. Therefore, it is important to
examine exchange rate exposure by sub-period so that exposures over a short
period are not masked over longer term.
3.4.2 An Alternative Measure of Exposure
Since the foreign exchange rate risk can have a direct impact on Þrms short-
term cash ßows, in this section I examine the effects of exchange rate changes
on a near-term measure of changes in a Þrms operations, the change in ana-
lysts forecasts of a Þrms annual earnings. Using this measure, I can investi-
gate whether exchange rate exposure is relevant to Þrm cash ßow by examining
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how analysts revise their forecasts in response to exchange rate movements. If
analysts consider exchange rate exposure to be important to the Þrms near-
term earnings, then they should revise their estimates of those earnings when
exchange rates change. Although the Þrms earnings Þgure itself is an al-
ternative candidate, it is not as good a measure as analysts forecasts for two
reasons. First, earnings are only available on a quarterly or annual basis, which
means I would have low power for my tests due to the low frequency of the
data. Analyst forecasts are available at a higher frequency (monthly). Second,
the measurement of a Þrms earnings is an ex post measure and my interest is
in a measure of investor expectations, which is proxied by analyst forecasts. In
these tests, I estimate a Þrms cash ßow exposure by measuring the revision of
analyst earning forecasts around exchange rate movements. Since my earning
forecast data only cover the 1977-1996 period, the intersection of the earning
forecast data and the 737 sample Þrms with foreign businesses results in 439
Þrm in the twenty years. The following regression is run for each of the 439
Þrms in the earning forecast sample,
EPSj,t −EPSj,t−1
Pj,t−1
= αj + βjR
fx
t + εj,t (3.5)
where EPSj,t is the month t analyst forecast of Þrm j
0s annual EPS, Pj,t−1 is
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the price of Þrm j0s stock in month t − 1, and Rfxt is the percentage change
of trade-weighted value of foreign currency per U.S. dollar. Because analysts
revise their forecasts at the beginning of each forecast period to reßect new
information about Þrms next period earnings, we control for this adjustment
in model (13.6) by including DUMj,t, a dummy variable added to control
for any revision of the EPS forecast which is unrelated to the exchange rate
ßuctuation at the beginning of each Þscal year. DUMj,t is equal to 1 if EPSj,t




= αj + βjR
fx
t + djDUMj,t + εj,t (3.6)
Table 15 reports the results for models (13.5) and (13.6). For both
models, the proportion of Þrms with statistically signiÞcant exposures to the
exchange rate risk is slightly higher than that in Table 13. For model (13.5)
I Þnd signiÞcant exposures for 16.86% of the Þrms at the 10% level. Since
analyst forecasts can be viewed as proxies for investors expectations, this
alternative measure of exchange rate exposure suggests that the percentage
of Þrms whose cash ßows are affected by currency risk is higher than that found
through return exposure. These results imply that exchange rate exposure is
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more of a short-term effect that cannot be as easily detected using changes
in Þrm value. Thus, exchange rate movements seem to have an effect on
Þrm value that investors expect to be short term. Further, since we still Þnd
a relatively small proportion of large U.S. Þrms with signiÞcant exposure, an
interpretation is that investors expect that the other Þrms are not signiÞcantly
affected due to offsetting exposures, either through hedging or through natural
offsets.
Another distinguishing feature of using changes in analysts forecasts in
the model is that there are more Þrms with signiÞcantly positive exposure than
Þrms with signiÞcantly negative exposure. That is, there are more Þrms in the
U.S. that appear to beneÞt from an appreciation of the U.S. dollar than Þrms
that are hurt by such an appreciation. This result is in contrast to the result
for using stock returns in Table 13, where the percentage of positive versus
negative exposure are approximately equal. Finally, the dummy variable in
model (13.6) has a small effect on the coefficient estimates. But the Þtness of
the model is signiÞcantly improved.
The result from this alternative measure of foreign exchange exposure
indicates that investors expect foreign exchange risk to have short-run effect
on Þrms operation. Therefore, foreign exchange risk is not necessarily always
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relevant to Þrms fundamental value.
3.4.3 Financial Characteristics and Exchange Rate Ex-
posure
Given the various ways in which currency ßuctuation can directly or indi-
rectly affect Þrms operations, it is important to determine how much of any
immediate impact on cash ßows is transformed into impact on Þrm values.
In the following two sections I examine the relation between Þrms Þnancial
characteristics and their exchange rate exposure. SpeciÞcally, I address two
issues. First, what types of Þrms are more likely to be exposed to exchange
risk? Second, among Þrms whose stock prices exhibit signiÞcant correlation
with exchange rate movements, is there any cross-sectional variation in their
exposures?
I hypothesize that the higher is a Þrms expected cost of Þnancial dis-
tress, the more likely the ßuctuation of its cash ßow from exchange rate move-
ments leads to change in value. The expected cost of Þnancial distress can be
larger because of greater probability of Þnancial distress. I examine Þnancial
characteristics that are related to Þrms short-term liquidity: the quick ratio
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and the current ratio.3 Additional indicators of the probability of Þnancial
distress include the level of the Þrms leverage: short-term leverage, which is
the ratio of current liability to total asset; and the interest coverage ratio,
deÞned as the sum of pretax income and interest expenses divided by interest
expenses. Additionally, I consider the size of Þrm as proxied by total sales.
However, although size is an indicator of the expected cost of Þnancial distress,
it has a more complex relation with the exchange rate exposure, making the
effect of size on Þrms exchange rate exposure ambiguous. On the one hand,
large Þrms generally have more access to external and internal Þnancing and
therefore have lower probabilities of Þnancial distress. On the other hand,
large Þrms are also more likely to conduct multinational business and thus be
more affected by exchange rate movements through multiple potential sources.
Since Þrms Þnancial constraints affect the expected cost of Þnancial distress,
I measure Þnancial constraints with total dividend payouts, deÞned by the
total of dividends paid to preferred and common shareholders divided by the
previous years assets.
A Þrms growth opportunities is related to its cost of Þnancial distress.
Firms with greater growth opportunities suffer more from underinvestment as
3The quick ratio is measured as cash and accounts receivable divided by current liabilities.
The current ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.
94
the result of potential Þnancial distress. However, underinvestment costs will
only be realized in the presence of both large growth opportunities and costly
external Þnancing. Therefore, I examine the interaction terms between the
level of external Þnancing and growth opportunities as proxied by the total
debt ratio*market-to-book ratio (M/B) and the total debt ratio*R&D/Sales.
As discussed in Titman and Wessels (1988), the cost of Þnancial distress can
be large for Þrms with very specialized products because the consequence of
disrupted long-run relation with customers and business partners is severe.
While R&D expenses can proxy for degree of specialization, I also include the
interaction term between the total debt ratio and Selling expenses/Sales as it
has fewer missing values and is highly correlated with R&D expenses.4 Due to
the frequent missing of R&D expenses for many Þrms, in all regression anal-
ysis of this study, I use the interaction between total debt ratio and Selling
expenses/Sales as the proxy for growth opportunities and product specializa-
tion.
Based upon the result of model (13.4) in Table 14, each period I classify
all Þrms into two groups depending on whether the sensitivity of stock price
to exchange rate movement is signiÞcant or not. I then compare these two
4Their correlation is as high as 60% in the sample.
95
groups period by period in terms of their Þnancial characteristics. my main
objective is to examine whether the long run fundamental values of Þrms
with higher expected costs of Þnancial distress are more likely to be affected
by exchange rate risk. Table 16 presents the median value of these Þnancial
characteristics for each group during the twenty-four years. The Wilcoxon rank
sum test indicates that during the Þrst period of 01/1977-03/1985, Þrms that
show signiÞcant return exposure to currency risk have lower current ratios
but greater sales and R&D expenses. However, these Þrms seem to have
signiÞcantly smaller selling expenses which is contrary to our expectation.
The results are very different during the second period. Over this pe-
riod, the group of Þrms with signiÞcant exchange rate exposures appear to
have a much lower quick ratio and total dividend payout as compared to Þrms
not exposed to currency risk. At the median, they also have a 0.76% higher
level of short-term leverage. These are strong indications that Þrms that suffer
liquidity problems are more likely to be driven into Þnancial distress through
volatility of cash ßows caused by exchange rate ßuctuations. Again, I Þnd
that large Þrms are more likely to be exposed to exchange rate risk. Con-
sistent with the underinvestment theory, I also Þnd that exposed Þrms have
greater growth opportunities as represented by the larger value of Total debt
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ratio*M/B or Total debt ratio*R&D expenses. Note that the relation between
growth opportunities and exchange rate exposure is stronger in the second
period than in the Þrst one. This may have to do with the dramatic increase
in the number of high-tech Þrms in the second period that covers the recent
technology boom.5 Finally, Þrms that produce specialized products appear to
be more affected by exchange rate risk.
In general, the observed differences between these two groups of Þrms
in terms of these proxies for expected Þnancial distress costs support the idea
that exchange rate movement has an especially prominent impact on those
Þrms whose values are very sensitive to short-term cash ßows.
3.4.4 The Cross-Sectional Variation in Firms Exchange
Rate Exposures
Having identiÞed the conditions over which exchange rate risk is detectable
from stock price, I now turn to the issue of cross-sectional variation in Þrms
return exposure. In other words, I want to Þnd the determinants of the mag-
nitude of exchange rate exposure. In Table 17, I partition the group of Þrms
5An industry breakdown among Þrms with signiÞcant exchange rate exposure indicates
that the concentration in the electronic and computer industries is much higher in the second
period than in the Þrst period.
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that are found to have signiÞcant exchange rate exposure using different ex-
planatory variables. SpeciÞcally, I classify Þrms into high and low groups
based upon their average quick and current ratios, short-term leverage, inter-
est coverage ratio, growth opportunities, and selling expenses in each period.
Since I do not have any priors on whether a Þrm is a net importer or a net
exporter, I focus on the magnitude rather than the sign of the exposure as
estimated in Table 14. Table 17 reports the mean and median absolute value
of the exposure for each high and low group. The p-values from the Wilcoxon
rank-sum test of no differences in exposure across high and low groups are also
presented. In at least one of the two periods, Þrms exchange rate exposures
increase with their short-term leverage, growth opportunities, and selling ex-
penses and decrease with their interest coverage ratio and dividend payout.
Interesting, although large Þrms are more likely to be exposed to exchange
rate risk as shown in Table 16, I Þnd that the magnitude of their exposures
is signiÞcantly smaller as compared to Þrms with smaller sales that are also
exposed to currency risk. Possible explanations for this Þnding include large
Þrms superior ability to minimize the risk that they are aware of through
hedging or their higher possibility of having offsetting exposures which would
reduce the impact of exchange rate risk.
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Although I Þnd Þrms with low liquidity and large Þnancial distress
cost are more exposed to exchange rate risk, these same characteristics also
suggest strong incentives for Þrms to hedge foreign exchange risk. For example,
Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) provide evidence that Þrms with greater
growth opportunities and tighter Þnancial constraints are more likely to use
currency derivatives. In this study, I implicitly assume that hedging cannot
fully insulate these Þrms from currency risk. This assumption is consistent
with evidences provided in current literature. According to Brown (2001) and
the survey by Bodnar and Marston (1998), most U.S. Þrms hedge selectively
rather than completely. There is no evidence of superior Þnancial performance
for selective hedgers either. (See, for example, Brown, Crabb and Haushalter,
2002.)
3.5 Industry Level Analysis
Since a Þrm can face multiple currency exposures through direct and indirect
channels, this study, as well as most previous empirical studies, uses a trade-
weighted index to test the effect of exchange rate changes on Þrm value. By
using this index, we are implicitly assuming that a Þrm is exposed to all
currencies in the basket in the same magnitude as the composition of the
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basket. If Þrms exposures vary from this basket of exposures, the empirical
tests may fail to capture the true underlying exposures. Moreover, without
detailed Þrm level data on foreign business, it is difficult to assess Þrms net
exposure because their diverse exposures to multiple currencies may simply
offset each other. Given that monthly U.S. foreign trade data are readily
available at the industry level, in this section I examine the foreign exchange
risk from a macro perspective by estimating net exposure at the industry level.
Since I am constrained by the availability of industry trade data, I
conduct the industry level analysis for a shorter period of 10 years between
1989-1998. However, since I have information on each U.S. manufacturing
industries net trade positions and I am interested in their aggregate exposure,
I do not have to restrict the sample to the 737 Þrms used in individual Þrm
analysis. For all Þrms in the manufacturing section with stock and Þnancial
information available from CRSP and Compustat, each year I form industry
portfolios according to their previous year-end 2-digit SIC codes. Portfolios
are formed on both an equal-weighted and value-weighted basis (the latter is
according to Þrms previous years market capitalization). Over the sample
period, these industry portfolios have an average of 96 Þrms in them each
year with a minimum of 16 Þrms (the Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics
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industry) and a maximum of 298 Þrms (the Electronics industry).6 First,
for each value-weighted or equally weighted industry portfolio I regress their
monthly returns on the percentage change of exchange rate and the value-
weighted CRSP market index return. The estimates of exposure together
with each industrys average trade balance over the 10 years are reported in
Table 18.
According to Table 18, during the 10 years between 1989 and 1998, the
majority of U.S. manufacturing industries has a trade deÞcit, which implies
that they should have positive exposure to exchange rate risk. Indeed, I Þnd
that 12 out of these 19 equal-weighted industry portfolios show signiÞcantly
positive exposures.7 These exposures are economically signiÞcant as well be-
cause a 1% change in the value of the dollar will lead to 0.27% to 0.94% change
in the value of these industry portfolios. The exposures documented in the
value-weighted portfolios differ as only 7 out of the 12 industries still show sig-
niÞcantly positive exposure when value-weighted portfolios are formed. One
industry (SIC=38), which has trade surpluses, exhibits signiÞcantly negative
6The Tobacco industry is excluded because the number of Þrms is less than 4.
7By forming industry portfolios at 4-digit SIC level and running seemingly unrelated
regression among them for each 2-digit SIC industry group, Allayannis (1997) Þnds that 3
out of 18 industry group exhibit signiÞcant exposures. One possible reason for our diverse
results may be the different sample periods. Allayannis (1997) covers 1979 through 1995
while we focus on the period between 1989 and 1998.
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exposure as expected. This indicates that although an industry may have a
signiÞcant trade balance as a whole, it is possible that the impact of exchange
rate movement is mainly born by small Þrms as large Þrms may engage in
more effective hedging against exchange rate risk or have a more diverse base
of local currency costs which serves to counterbalance the impact of exchange
rate risk on their values.
Allayannis (1997) examines the time-varying exposure of industry port-
folios and provides evidence that exchange rate exposure can vary with U.S.
industry import and export shares. Bodnar et al (1998) and Allayannis and
Ihrig (2001) also examine the effect the time variation of industry structure
has on exposure. Motivated by this evidence of time-varying exposures, I ex-
amine how the exposures of industry returns vary with both industry trade
shares and Þnancial characteristics of typical Þrms in those industries. To
examine these two sources of variation cross-sectionally and over time, I es-
timate the aggregate exposure of U.S. manufacturing industries through the
following pooled regression:











)(expected cost of Þnancial distress) + εi,t (3.7)
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where Ri,t is the return on industry i; Rmt is the value-weighted market re-







) are logged shares of imports and exports for industry i at time t
respectively.
Under a Þxed effect model, I estimate equation (14.1) using the median
expected cost of Þnancial distress of each industry as proxied by variables that
measure Þrms liquidity, availability of internal funds and growth opportuni-
ties. To facilitate comparison among different proxies, I use the inverse of
quick ratio, current ratio, size and dividend to represent the expected costs
of Þnancial distress.8 To allieviate the potential heterskedasticity from Þrms
market-to-book ratios, the growth opportunities is proxied by the total debt ra-
tio*log(M/B). The results from equally weighted industry portfolios are shown
in Table 19.9 As predicted by the theory, exchange rate exposures of U.S. man-
ufacturing industries are signiÞcantly increasing with their shares of imports
and decreasing with shares of exports, which indicates that an appreciation
of the dollar beneÞts importers and hurts exporters. More importantly, the
beneÞt and cost of exchange rate movements appear to be increasing with
Þrms expected cost of Þnancial distress as illustrated by the signiÞcance of
8We omit the coverage ratio because some Þrms have extremely negative coverage ratios.
The inverse of negative coverage will wrongly indicate smaller costs of Þnancial distress.
9Results from equally or value-weighted industry portfolios are very similar.
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the interaction term among exchange rate movement, trade shares and all the
variables I have considered to proxy for the expected cost of Þnancial distress.
That is, the exposure of U.S. manufacturing industries is signiÞcantly decreas-
ing with quick ratio, current ratio, size and dividend payout and increasing
with short-term leverage, growth opportunities and selling expenses. Inter-
estingly, at the industry level the association between growth opportunities
and return exposure is much more important than at the individual Þrm level.
This may be due to larger dispersion of growth opportunities across industries
than across individual Þrms within the same industry.
As a whole, under a speciÞcation that allows both time-series and cross-
sectional variation of exposure, the industry analysis provides strong support
to my hypothesis that exchange rate risk is more likely to affect the value of
Þrms with larger costs of Þnancial distress.
3.6 Stock Price Reaction to Exchange Rate
Shocks
Doidge, Griffin and Williamson (2000) provide evidence that Þrms with large
foreign sales underperform Þrms with no foreign sales during periods of large
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currency appreciation and overperform them during periods of large currency
depreciation. This suggests that the correlation between stock price and ex-
change rate may be stronger during large currency movements. In this section,
I examine whether stock price reactions to exchange rate shocks vary system-
atically across Þrms. The Þndings on this issue will help us assess the economic
signiÞcance of exchange rate exposure. If exchange rate risk has the potential
to cause severe liquidity problem or affect the fundamental value of a Þrm,
most likely the impact will be observed during large currency movements.
We examine these reactions using an event study approach. An ad-
vantage of the event study methodology is that I avoid imposing any speciÞc
structure on the relation between currency risk and Þrm value. Extensive ev-
idence has shown that a Þrms exposure may depend on the level of foreign
trade (see, for example, He and Ng, 1998; Doidge et al, 2000), the competi-
tive structure of the market in which it operates (see, for example, Bodnar,
Dumas, and Marston, 1998; Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001.), and the size of the
exchange rate movements (see Doidge et al, 2000). Although I have attempted
to alleviate this problem by analyzing exposures in two different sub-periods
and allowing for time-varying exposures, it is debatable whether the current
approach of imposing a linear relation between exchange rate risk and return
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is appropriate. The event study approach allows us to focus on the cross-
sectional variation of foreign exchange exposure at a point of time without
worrying about the speciÞcation problem.
First, I focus on how Þrms react to one of the most important economic
events during the sample period, the announcement of the Plaza Accord. The
Plaza Accord was signed on September 23, 1985. On the next day, the U.S.
dollar experienced the largest one-day depreciation (-2.7%). Over the sample
period, although the Plaza Accord was signed under the background of fun-
damental macroeconomic issues such as a large U.S. trade deÞcits and high
unemployment rates, and the depreciation of dollar might, to some extent, be
anticipated by investors, the actual magnitude of the dollar movement was still
uncertain. I can thus infer how much a Þrms value should be affected by the
expected depreciation of the dollar from the abnormal returns and volatilities
around the announcement. Since I lack information on Þrms foreign sales at
that time, it is difficult for us to distinguish whether the absence of reaction
to the announcement of the Accord by individual Þrms is due to the irrele-
vance of exchange rate risk to Þrm value or due to the pure domestic nature
of a Þrms business. To circumvent this data problem, I infer whether a Þrm
should be affected by the depreciation of dollar by examining revisions in ana-
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lyst forecasts of Þrms earnings after the Plaza Accord. Since analysts closely
monitor the Þnancial and operational conditions of the Þrms they follow, they
will update their forecasts of Þrms earnings if they expect those earnings to
be signiÞcantly affected by the dollar depreciation. Since the news came at
the end of September after most analysts had issued their forecasts, I compare
forecasted earnings in October with the earlier August forecasts. If there is
no change in the consensus earnings forecast of a Þrms next period earnings,
then I consider that Þrm as not exposed to exchange rate risk at that time
and exclude it from the event study sample.
There are many sources of variation for stock returns. Particularly, for
a joint economic agreement among major countries like the Plaza Accord, it is
possible that stock prices react to the announcement through the inßuences of
some macroeconomic factors that widely impact all Þrms rather than through
their direct exposures to foreign exchange ßuctuation. Due to this endogenous
nature of the event, I am interested in examining the cross-sectional variation
in stock price reactions around the announcement of the Accord rather than
the magnitude of the reactions. I expect that if Þrms earnings are affected by
the exchange rate shock, then the stock price reactions should be more pro-
nounced for those Þrms that are Þnancially constrained or have large expected
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Þnancial distress costs.
To determine the stock price reactions, I estimate the following market
model using a 180-day window that ends 60 days before September 23, 1985,
Ri,t = αi + βiRmt + εi,t for t=-240,-60 (3.8)
where Rmt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index. Then
I calculate the abnormal returns for each of the 5 days around the announce-
ment,
ARi,t = Ri,t − αi − βiRmt t=-2,2 (3.9)
After calculating the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the Þve
day window for each Þrm, I examine whether they vary systematically ac-
cording to the Þnancial characteristics I have found to be important in ex-
plaining exchange rate exposure. SpeciÞcally, I regress the absolute value of
CAR on the quick ratio, short-term leverage, interest coverage dummy, log
of sales, total dividend payouts, the interaction between total leverage and
the log of market-to-book ratio, and the interaction between total leverage
and selling expenses. All variables are calculated as of the end of 1984. I
108
focus on the absolute value of CAR because of the differences in reactions one
would expect for net importers versus net exporters. Net importers should
experience negative abnormal returns from the unexpected dollar depreciation
while net exporters should experience positive ones.10 To control for potential
heteroskedasticity across Þrms, the dependent and independent variables are
scaled by the standard deviation of residuals from equation (15.1). The results
of this weighted least squares regression is presented in the Þrst column of Ta-
ble 20. As expected, the stock prices of Þrms with high short-term leverage,
low coverage ratio, small size and low dividend payouts show stronger reaction
to the news of sharp dollar depreciation than do Þrms that are less Þnancially
constrained. This result provides support to my hypothesis. When there is a
large, unexpected shock to the value of the U.S. dollar, although cash ßows
of all Þrms in the event study sample are affected, stock prices of Þrms that
have larger probabilities of Þnancial distress respond more strongly in terms of
larger magnitude of abnormal returns during the event period. I do not Þnd
any evidence that Þrms with greater growth opportunities experience larger
abnormal returns.
I also employ an alternative approach to determine whether there is
10Since some Þrms have extremely negative interest rate coverage ratio, I replace the
actual coverage ratio with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a Þrms
coverage ratio is above the sample median and zero otherwise.
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cross-sectional variation in stock price reaction to an exchange rate shock. Due
to the uncertainty regarding the direction and magnitude of potential dollar
movements at the time of the Plaza Accord, the volatility of the exchange
rate was greater than normal. In the 91 days surrounding the announcement
of the Plaza Accord, the volatility of daily percentage change of the dollar
index increased to 0.0029% from the number of 0.0019% in the same period a
year previous. Thus, I can examine the sensitivity of stock prices to exchange
rate risk through the relation between exchange rate variability and stock
return variability. Again, since I am interested in how Þrms expected costs
of Þnancial distress are related to their return exposures, I examine whether
return volatility is increased with higher exchange rate volatility and how this
increase varies cross-sectionally. Therefore, I Þrst calculate the ratio of Þrms
daily return volatility during the 91 days centered around the announcement
day relative to that in the same period a year earlier. Then I regress the log
of that ratio against the set of variables that proxy for Þrms costs of Þnancial
distress. The result of this regression is shown in the second column of Table
20. Similar to the results from the abnormal returns, I Þnd that the increase
in volatility as the result of the exchange rate shock is larger for Þrms with
higher short-term leverage, smaller size and lower coverage ratio.
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Since the announcement of the Plaza Accord represents one single event,
I also examine how stock prices respond to other large currency movements to
check the statistical signiÞcance of my event study result. SpeciÞcally, I Þrst
calculate the standard deviation of daily percentage change of exchange rate
over the whole sample period of 1977 to 2000. Then I deÞne daily exchange
rate changes that are more than four standard deviation, in absolute value,
from zero as large currency movements. It turns out that there are 13 days
(including the announcement day of the Plaza Accord) that fall into this cat-
egory. For the 12 events excluding the announcement of the Plaza Accord, I
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns during the Þve-day window of (-2,2)
for all the 737 Þrms. Following the analysis on the Plaza Accord, I regress the
absolute value of Þrms average abnormal returns across the 12 events on their
average cost of Þnancial distress.11 The result of this analysis is presented in
the last column of Table 20. It appears that Þrms average abnormal returns
during large exchange rate movements are signiÞcantly increasing with their
levels of short-term leverage, growth opportunities and selling expenses. On
the other hand, small Þrms and Þrms with low dividend payout show signif-
icantly stronger response to exchange rate shocks. Therefore, the pattern in
11The 13 large exchange rate movements take place in the year of 1978, 1981, 1985, 1988,
1989, 1995 and 1998. Firms average Þnancial characteristics are averages across these 7
years.
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Þrms reaction to the announcement of the Plaza Accord is persistent across
all kinds of large exchange rate movements.
3.7 Summary of Chapter 2
In summary, Chapter 3 examines the exchange rate exposure of U.S. manu-
facturing Þrms from a new perspective. By noting that exchange rate changes
affect a Þrms operation through its impact on cash ßows, I propose that
whether or how much a Þrms fundamental value is exposed to currency risk
depends on how sensitive its value is to the volatility of short-term cash ßows.
I Þnd the returns of Þrms with higher expected Þnancial distress costs,
for example, lower liquidity, smaller size and greater growth opportunities, are
more likely to be signiÞcantly correlated with exchange rate changes. Among
Þrms with signiÞcant foreign exchange exposure, the magnitude of the expo-
sures tends to increase with their expected Þnancial distress costs. I provide
additional support to our hypothesis by showing that at the aggregate level,
U.S. manufacturing industries exchange rate exposures also exhibit signiÞcant
correlation with the returns sensitivity to short-term cash ßows, and this cor-
relation appears to be even stronger than at the individual Þrm level. Finally,
I examine exchange rate exposure through an event study methodology. I
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Þnd that during a large, unexpected depreciation of the dollar after the Plaza
Accord, Þrms with higher expected costs of Þnancial distress show larger ex-
posure as measured by their larger abnormal returns and abnormal volatilities





In this appendix, the equilibrium is derived under three conditions:
symmetric information (section A1), asymmetric information (section A2),
and multiple incumbents (section A3).
A.1 Equilibrium Under Symmetric Informa-
tion











. Firm 1 will reject any
other offer.
Before entry occurs, Þrm 1 maximize:
max
q1
(a− bq1) ∗ q1 − CI ∗ q1 (A1.1)












If L approaches Þrm 1 with a merger offer, Þrm 1s payoff will be the bid if








− B, if CI > CB > CS
(A1.3)
because the merged the Þrm will adopt the technology of the more efficient
party.
If the offer from L is rejected, then L will have to enter the market
directly, in which case it will play a two-Þrm Cournot game with Þrm 1. Their
objective function will be:
max
qi
[a− b(q1 + qL)]qi − CI ∗ qi, i = 1, L (A1.4)
The payoff of L will be its share of proÞts in the two-Þrm Cournot game net




(a− 2CB + CI)2 − F < 0 (A1.5.1)
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(a− 2CI + CB)2 (A1.5.2)
Since Ls post direct entry proÞt is not enough to recover the Þxed entry cost,
L will not enter the market if Þrm 1 rejects the merger offer. In that case,





. Therefore, in equilibrium Þrm 1
will reject any offer from L that is lower than its current proÞt. On the other








its offer will be rejected and it will earn zero.
When facing a merger offer from H, Þrm 1s payoff will be the bid if the








− B, if CI > CB > CS or CB > CI > CS
(A1.6)
If the offer is rejected, H will have to enter the market directly, which will lead




(a− 2CS + CI)2 − F > 0 (A1.7)
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On the other hand, Þrm 1s payoff will be ΠE,H1 =
1
9b
(a− 2CI + CS)2 = BH∗ .
Therefore, in equilibrium if H offers BH
∗
to Þrm 1, neither party will have any
incentive to deviate. If H offers B < BH
∗
, its offer will be rejected by Þrm 1
because Þrm 1 will earn πE,H1 = B












Therefore, H will not deviate. Similarly, Þrm 1 has no incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy and reject BH
∗
because its payoff in the two-
Þrm Cournot competition will be exactly the same as BH
∗
.
A.2 Equilibrium Under Asymmetric Informa-
tion
In this appendix I prove the equilibrium outcome when the type of Þrm 2 is
unknown to Þrm 1. When E(πE1 ) > π
M,H
2 −(πE,H2 −F ) there exists a separating






1 . The separating equilibrium is supported by the out-of-
equilibrium belief of Firm 1 that an offer that is less than BL
∗
must be from
L and will then be rejected.
Case 1: CB > CS > CI
First lets see why H does not want to make any off equilibrium move.
If H makes an offer of B such that B > BL
∗
, Þrm 1 will accept the offer. Then




(a− CI)2 −B < 1
4b
(a− CI)2 − BL∗ = 0
which is less than ΠE,H2 =
1
9b
(a−2CS+CI)2−F,its net payoff from direct entry.
Therefore, H will be worse off by deviating from equilibrium strategy. L will
also stick to the equilibrium strategy because if it bids lower it will be rejected
and left with no other entry choice. Next I will show that Þrm 1 will not be




1 . First, if it is facing a bid
πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F ) < B < πw/o1 , it can infer that the offer is from L because
H will not make any offer greater than πM,H2 − (πE,H2 −F ) which will leave its
post merger net payoff to be ΠM,H2 = π
M,H
2 − B < πE,H2 − F. Thus Þrm 1 will
act according to its equilibrium strategy to reject such an offer. Second, if it is
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facing a bid less than or equal to πE,H1 , obviously it will reject the offer because
even if the offer is from H, Þrm 1 still can make πE,H1 in the two-Þrm game with
H. Third, if Þrm 1 is approached with πE,H1 < B ≤ πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F ), then










if rejects such an offer. However, if E(πE1 ) > π
M,H
2 − (πE,H2 − F ), there is no
reason for Þrm 1 to accept B ≤ πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F ) even if Þrm 1 cannot tell
whether the bidder is H or L. In other words, there is no value of B which can
separate H from L and Þrm 1 would rather bear the risk of rejecting H than
accepting a bid which could possibly come from L. Note that the smaller b
and F are, the more likely E(πE1 ) > π
M,H
2 − (πE,H2 − F ) will be satisÞed.
Following from the above analysis, when E(πE1 ) ≤ πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F )
, there exists a pooling equilibrium where both H and L will bid at Þrm 1s
reservation price of E(πE1 ).
Case 2: CI > CB > CS or CB > CI > CS
In this case, it is possible that when H is much more efficient than C,
the beneÞt of merging with Þrm 1 is so large that H will be willing to pay
more than L does to merge with Þrm 1. This will occur when max(BH) =
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πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F ) > πw/o1 . However, even if there exists a value of BH at
which L cannot afford to mimic H, H would rather pool with L by paying the
reservation price of E(πE1 ) to Þrm 1.
When max(BH) = πM,H2 − (πE,H2 − F ) ≤ πw/o1 , the analysis is simi-
lar to case 1 where there could be either separating equilibrium or pooling
equilibrium depending on the value of b and F.
A.3 EquilibriumWithMore Than One Incum-
bent
When there are more than one incumbent in the market, the merger between
Þrm 1 and Þrm 2 will have spillover effect on other Þrms in the market. The
strategic response of other incumbents than the target will affect the Hs de-
cision on whether pooling with L or signaling its type by entering the market
directly.
Suppose Þrm 3 is identical to Þrm 1 and is producing in the same
market together with Þrm 1. Now if there exists a pooling equilibrium in
which both H and L will enter by merging with Þrm 1, Þrm 3 will play the
two-Þrm Cournot game with the combined Þrm and decide on its quantity in
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next period based upon its expectation of the merged Þrms marginal cost.











[a− b(qH + q3)]q3 − CIq3
ª
(A3.1)
The best response function of Þrm 3 is:
q3 =
a− CI − b[1
2





Similarly, the best response function of H is:
qH =
a− bq3 − CS
2b
(A3.2.2)






























(a− 3CS + 2CI)2
16b
− F (A3.5)
If πM,H2 − E(πE1 ) < (πE,H2 − F ), then H will deviate from the equilibrium
strategy of pooling with L and bidding Þrm 1 for E(πE1 ). According to analysis






equilibrium will be sustained. Now with the strategic response from other
incumbents, the possible parameter region of b and F that can support a
separating equilibrium is expanded. Since
(2a+ 2CI − [1
2





(a− 2CS + CI)2
9b
(A3.6)
The pooling equilibrium will only be viable when
E(πE1 ) <
(2a+ 2CI − [1
2










The separating equilibrium becomes more likely if we take the strategic
response of other incumbents into consideration. When A3.7 does not hold,
only the separating equilibrium can be sustained. Again, the smaller b and F









Summary Statistics of the Foreign Direct Investment Data 
 
Total number of foreign direct investment is the total of M&A, joint ventures and new plants that took 
place in the U.S. each year. Industry level measures are calculated according to the Fama-French 48 
industry groupings. 
   
Panel A: Time Series Distribution of M&A in Foreign Direct Investment 
 




Average # of 
M&A Each 
Industry 
87 495 738 69.92% 15.00 
88 440 626 69.23% 14.19 
89 440 603 71.03% 14.67 
90 352 478 71.95% 14.08 
91 227 350 64.17% 10.32 
92 112 197 53.82% 6.22 
93 112 182 62.33% 6.22 
94 142 225 64.59% 7.89 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Proxies for Fixed Entry Cost and Market 
Competitiveness 
 
 R&D/SalesAdvertising/SalesCapexp/PPE Selling/Sales H-index 
R&D/Sales 1 -0.0113 0.3597a 0.6060a 0.1604b 
      
Advertising/Sales  1 -0.0659 0.1586b 0.1144 
      
Capexp/PPE   1 0.4805a 0.4254a 
      
Selling/Sales    1 0.3586a 
      
H-index     1 
 
a, b, and c denote for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 127
Table 2 
Cross-Industry Variation in the Frequency of Mergers 
 
Across all industries and all years between 1987-1994, the log ratio of the total number of mergers to 
the total number of direct entry in each industry is regressed on the previous year’s industry 
characteristics. t-statistics based on Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  0.8672 0.5454 0.2379 0.3277 0.7152 -0.2121 
  (4.21)a (1.97)b (0.65) (0.93) (2.75)a (-0.55) 
        
R&D/Sales 3.5286     2.7756 
  (2.53)a     (2.07)** 
        
Advertising/Sales  17.4193    22.5185 
   (1.76)c    (2.22)** 
        
Capexp/PPE   3.1503   2.4055 
    (2.44)b   (1.85)* 
        
Selling/Sales    3.0886   
     (2.47)b   
        
H-index      2.1784 0.3593 
      (1.77)c (0.25) 
        
Drug  -0.9224 -0.1426 -0.1379 -0.6992 0.1446 -1.1161 
  (-1.63) (-0.46) (-0.49) (-1.70)c (0.50) (-1.89)* 
        
Chemical  -0.6546 -0.7051 -0.5556 -0.5621 -0.5960 -0.6463 
  (-3.45)a (-3.50)a (-2.70)a (-2.84)a (-2.97)a (-3.05)***
        
Oil  0.5354 0.7907 0.6911 0.7040 0.5341 1.1249 
  (2.16)b (2.75)a (3.29)a (2.56)a (2.34)b (4.06)*** 
        
Auto  -2.0714 -1.9868 -2.0976 -1.8342 -2.0976 -1.9157 
  (-6.53)a (-6.54)a (-6.63)a (-5.40)a (-6.96)a (-6.19)***
        
Electronic  -0.4398 -0.2306 -0.4081 -0.4900 -0.5443 -0.3138 
  (-1.72)c (-0.89) (-1.58) (-1.93)b (-2.11)b (-1.12) 
        
Year 88-94 omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
        
N  182 182 182 182 182 182 
a, b, and c denote for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively
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Table 3 
Probit Analysis of the Relation Between Merger and Industry Characteristics 
 
Across all industries and all years between 1987-1994, the ratio of total number of cross-border 
mergers over total number of foreign direct investment in each industry is regressed on the previous 
year’s industry characteristics using a probit model. The Chi-square test statistics are reported in 
parentheses. a, b, and c denote for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  0.4665 0.1580 0.0392 0.1817 0.3821 -0.4313 
  (78.19)a (3.70)b (0.15) (4.26)b (41.89)a (10.71)a 
        
R&D/Sales 2.7139     2.1646 
  (15.96)a     (5.75)b 
        
Advertising/Sales  16.8844    21.5011 
   (32.46)a    (46.36)a 
        
Capexp/PPE   2.2078   1.8574 
    (32.35)a   (11.79)a 
        
Selling/Sales    1.7118   
     (23.73)a   
        
H-index      1.4746 0.0827 
      (23.03)a (0.04) 
        
Drug  -0.5576 -0.1990 -0.0908 -0.4045 0.0782 -0.8134 
  (5.75)b (1.06) (0.23) (3.78)b (0.17) (8.68)a 
        
Chemical  -0.4045 -0.4582 -0.3284 -0.3612 -0.3648 -0.4084 
  (21.73)a (27.50)a (14.04)a (17.19)a (17.56)a (20.95)a 
        
Oil  0.1915 0.4465 0.3366 0.2594 0.1878 0.7416 
  (2.10) (9.91)a (6.09)a (3.75)b (2.02) (24.49)a 
        
Auto  -1.3633 -1.2708 -1.3924 -1.2461 -1.3813 -1.2155 
  (134.60)a (113.75)a (140.85)a (106.22)a (138.48)a (102.31)a
        
Electronic  -0.3890 -0.2119 -0.3593 -0.4123 -0.4584 -0.2442 
  (6.88)a (2.02) (5.91)b (7.71)a (9.34)a (2.57) 
        
Year 88-94 omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted omitted 
        




Time Series and Geographic Distribution of Merger Activities During 1981-1998 
 
Industry and country breakdown is based upon the target sample. Since bidders and targets may not 
both be publicly traded firms around announcement dates, each year the number of targets and bidders 
may be different. 
 
    From Target Sample  
   Domestic Domestic Cross-border Cross-border
YEAR Bidder Target Cross-Ind Within-Ind Cross-Ind Within-Ind 
81 173 88 53 30 2 3 
82 184 99 56 32 4 2 
83 307 112 68 34 2 4 
84 351 171 95 54 8 1 
85 120 138 92 39 6 1 
86 157 198 107 67 16 6 
87 163 189 109 53 13 14 
88 182 253 145 67 21 19 
89 188 173 91 48 23 11 
90 165 105 45 38 12 9 
91 199 80 45 28 6 1 
92 273 63 28 34 1 0 
93 341 92 42 42 4 4 
94 456 162 67 76 12 7 
95 558 230 99 105 12 14 
96 609 242 114 109 14 5 
97 679 334 157 137 31 9 
98 683 385 148 189 22 26 




Region Number of Deals Percentage 
Japan 24 6.96% 
UK 110 31.88% 
Canada 59 17.10% 
Major European  85 24.64% 






Comparison of Deal Characteristics Across Domestic Cross Industry and Cross-
Border Deals 
 
Pearson Chi-square test is used to test the significance of differences between domestic and cross-
border deals in terms of the percentage of hostile deals, pure cash or pure stock offers, deals with 
competing bids and the percentage of tender offers.  
 
Whole sample (1981-1998) 
 
Domestic Cross-border Difference
 N=1561 N=345 (p-value) 
    
Hostile 4.68% 6.68% (0.189) 
    
Cash 52.15% 73.04% (0.001)a 
    
Stock 19.99% 7.25% (0.001)a 
    
Compete 9.56% 11.92% (0.186) 
    
Tender 35.81% 57.97% (0.001)a 
 
 
1980s       1990s 
 Domestic 
Cross-
border Difference   Domestic 
Cross-
border Difference
 N=816 N=156 (p-value)   N=745 N=189 (p-value) 
         
Hostile 6.62% 9.62% (0.182)  Hostile 2.55% 3.70% (0.389) 
         
Cash 52.45% 78.85% (0.001)a  Cash 51.81% 68.25% (0.001)a 
         
Stock 11.64% 1.28% (0.001)a  Stock 29.13% 12.17% (0.001)a 
         
Compete 12.41% 17.42% (0.091)c  Compete 6.44% 7.41% (0.643) 
         
Tender 43.01% 62.18% (0.001)a  Tender 27.92% 54.50% (0.001)a 
 
a, b, and c denote for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively
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Table 6 
Abnormal Returns for Targets and Bidders  
 
This table shows the abnormal returns for target and bidder shareholders around the merger 
announcement day. The table is divided between domestic mergers that are cross industry and cross-
border mergers. The last column provides a test of the difference in abnormal returns between these 
two types of mergers. Event window is defined to be 3 days before and 3 days after the announcement 
day. Estimation window is 240 days before the event to 41 days before the event. CRSP equally-
weighted return is used to proxy for the U.S. market return and Datastream country index returns are 
used for other markets. 
 





Cross-border   
z-stat of 
Eevent Day AR(%) z-score  AR(%) z-score  Difference 
        
-3 0.85% 10.52  0.66% 4.66  -0.26 
-2 0.87% 12.26  1.71% 8.84  2.77 
-1 1.81% 25.65  1.76% 13.40  1.22 
0 13.25% 180.64  16.80% 113.13  25.43 
1 3.65% 55.51  4.42% 28.95  2.55 
2 0.21% 3.87  0.54% 4.05  2.02 
3 -0.12% 0.37  -0.46% -0.52  -0.63 









Cross-border   
z-stat of 
Eevent Day AR(%) z-score  AR(%) z-score  Difference 
        
-3 0.20% 3.14  0.16% 1.86  0.52 
-2 0.19% 1.83  0.01% 0.09  -0.61 
-1 0.34% 2.61  0.38% 2.52  1.34 
0 0.88% 8.69  0.31% 0.07  -3.21 
1 0.43% 3.11  0.11% 1.70  0.39 
2 0.00% 0.39  0.00% 0.90  0.68 
3 0.04% 0.80  -0.32% -2.74  -2.84 





Regression Analysis of Target and Bidder Wealth Gains in Domestic and Cross-Border Takeovers 
 
The 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders are regressed against deal characteristics in Weighted Least Square regressions. 
Cross-border, cross-ind, cash, hostile, compete and take100% are binary variables set equal to one for cross-border deals, cross industry deals, pure 
cash offers, hostile takeovers, deals with competing bids and deals in which the acquirer owns 100% of the merged firm, respectively. Cross*FX is 
defined as the interaction between the cross-border dummy and quarterly percentage deviation of U.S. real exchange rate index from its average 
level during the sample period. Cross*stock is the interaction term between the cross-border dummy and a dummy variable indicating deals that are 
completed entirely or partially with equity. Size is the logged ratio of the deal value to the bidding firm’s market capitalization three months before 
the announcement date. Tax81 is a dummy variable for deals announced during 1981-1986. WWtax is a binary variable that is equal to one for U.K. 
and Japanese acquirers during the period of 1981-1986. Advisor indicates those deals in which the target firms’ financial advisors are top 














*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0780 0.0349 -0.0094 0.0382 0.0913 -0.0838 0.1330 -0.2489   -0.0343 0.0557 -0.0081 Target 
(2.71)a (2.30)b (-0.40) (3.98)a (5.03)a (-5.64)a (8.59)a (-2.52)a   (-3.44)a (1.32) (-0.82) 
 N: 1884    Adjusted R2: 0.081 
 
0.0269 -0.0122 -0.0042 -0.0009 -0.0164 -0.0084 -0.0079 0.0341 0.0148 0.0023 -0.0086 0.0169 -0.0067 Bidder 
(3.61)a (-2.81)a (-0.79) (-0.31) (-2.14)b (-1.31) (-1.83)c (1.17) (1.76)c (2.93)a (-2.75)a (1.34) (-1.90)c 
 N: 2959    Adjusted R2: 0.010 
 




Effect of Industry Characteristics on Differences in Wealth Gains Between Domestic and Cross-Border 
Takeovers 
 
The 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders are regressed against deal characteristics in Weighted Least Square regressions. 














*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
-0.0252 0.0766 0.0786 0.0317 0.1028 -0.0825 0.1482 -0.4814   -0.0248 0.0514 -0.0166 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(-0.61) (3.48)a (2.22)b (2.36)b (3.94)a (-4.22)a (7.38)a (-3.89)a   (-1.81)c (0.81) (-1.25) 
 N: 896     Adjusted R2: 0.112 
0.1631 0.0228 -0.0730 0.0465 0.0767 -0.0829 0.1082 0.1447   -0.0437 -0.0417 0.0010 Others 
(3.95)a (0.96) (-2.32)b (3.30)a (3.00)a (-3.62)a (4.44)a (0.73)   (-2.89)a (-0.57) (0.07) 














*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0292 -0.0177 -0.0109 0.0023 -0.0073 0.0004 -0.0088 0.0430 0.0299 0.0009 -0.0087 0.0086 -0.0115 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(2.95)a (-3.22)a (-1.54) (0.57) (-0.69) (0.05) (-1.61) (1.32) (2.72)a (0.82) (-2.14)b (0.64) (-2.29)b 
 N: 1390    Adjusted R2: 0.012 
0.0239 -0.0042 0.0047 -0.0026 -0.0264 -0.0167 -0.0080 0.0533 -0.0026 0.0039 -0.0083 0.0158 -0.0028 Others 
(2.12)b (-0.53) (0.59) (-0.59) (-2.36)b (-1.69)c (-1.16) (0.84) (-0.20) (3.42)a (-1.70)c (0.51) (-0.55) 
 N: 1567    Adjusted R2: 0.010 
a, b, and c denote for significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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Table 9 
Abnormal Returns for Targets and Bidders in Related Mergers 
 
This table shows the abnormal returns for target and bidder shareholders around the merger 
announcement day. The table is divided between domestic mergers and cross-border non-diversifying 
mergers. The last column provides a test of the difference in abnormal returns between these two types 
of mergers. 
Event window is defined to be 3 days before and 3 days after the announcement day. Estimation 
window is 240 days before the event to 41 days before the event. CRSP equally-weighted return is 
used to proxy for the U.S. market return and Datastream country index returns are used for other 
markets. 
 





Cross-border   z-stat of 
Eevent Day AR(%) z-score  AR(%) z-score  Difference 
        
-3 0.67% 6.41  0.72% 3.24  -0.94 
-2 0.99% 8.67  1.70% 7.75  1.50 
-1 2.43% 19.85  2.02% 12.59  -0.76 
0 14.02% 110.27  17.81% 94.09  14.89 
1 4.24% 37.22  4.67% 24.53  -0.80 
2 0.26% 2.88  0.15% 0.77  -0.99 
3 -0.02% 0.33  -0.45% -0.13  -0.29 









Cross-border   
z-stat of 
Eevent Day AR(%) z-score  AR(%) z-score  Difference 
        
-3 0.17% 1.08  0.29% 2.06  1.32 
-2 0.08% -0.29  -0.02% 0.02  0.15 
-1 0.07% -0.47  0.19% 0.86  0.98 
0 0.50% 4.38  0.04% -2.74  -4.47 
1 0.20% -0.02  0.01% 1.35  1.20 
2 0.09% 1.98  0.07% 0.67  -0.32 
3 -0.01% 0.18  -0.43% -2.68  -2.46 





Effect of Industry Characteristics on Differences in Target and Bidder Wealth Gains among Related Takeovers 
 
For the sample of related mergers, the 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders are regressed against deal characteristics in 













*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0238 0.0506 0.0101 0.1389 -0.1188 0.1468 -0.3099   -0.0034 0.1159 0.0246 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(0.72) (1.95)b (0.47) (2.77)a (-3.81)a (4.65)a (-1.52)   (-0.15) (1.55) (1.13) 
 N: 314     Adjusted R2: 0.155 
0.0276 -0.0158 0.1259 0.0465 -0.1016 0.2252 0.0224   -0.0442 0.0063 -0.0326 Others 
(0.52) (-0.50) (4.76)a (1.09) (-2.10)b (4.46)a (0.08)   (-1.57) (0.06) (-1.18) 












*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0032 -0.0194 0.0003 0.0003 0.0145 0.0035 0.0763 0.0428 0.0014 0.0228 0.0150 0.0125 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(0.30)a (-3.04)a (1.60) (0.02) (1.21) (0.39) (1.88)c (3.12)a -0.86 (-3.66)b (0.91) (-1.88)c 
 N: 6.11     Adjusted R2:: 0.036 
0.0111 0.0066 0.0081 -0.0247 -0.0017 -0.0012 0.0169 -0.0017 0.0015 -0.0041 -0.0393 0.0027 Others 
(1.05) (-0.77) (-1.48) (-1.56) (-0.12) (-0.13) (0.22) (-0.12) (1.01) (-0.62) (-0.75) (0.42) 
 N: 703      Adjusted R2: -0.001 




Differences in Target and Bidder Wealth Gains in Deals Within Selected Industries 
 
 
For the sub-sample of mergers in the medical equipment, drugs, chemicals, electrical equipment, automobiles, aerospace, telecommunication, computers, chips and 
the software industries, the 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders are regressed against deal characteristics in Weighted Least Square 

















*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0583 0.1625 -0.0097 0.0172 0.0615 -0.0918 0.0943 0.1369   -0.0045 -0.1702 -0.0023 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(0.87) (3.54)a (-0.17) (0.68) (1.48) (-2.39)b (3.21)a (0.36)   (-0.17) (-1.25) (-0.09) 
 N: 222     Adjusted R2: 0.139 
0.1997 -0.0077 -0.1416 0.0928 0.1208 -0.0925 0.1134 0.0058   -0.0636 0.1912 0.0178 Others 
(2.82)a (-0.17) (-2.59)a (3.74)a (1.53) (-1.40) (2.73)a (0.01)   (-2.20)b (0.73) (0.66) 












*Stock Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0482 -0.0345 -0.0161 0.0054 0.0198 -0.0139 -0.0210 -0.0264 0.0330 0.0008 -0.0136 0.0381 -0.0046 R&D<Median & H-index<0.18 
(1.91)c (-2.34)b (-0.95) (0.67) (1.01) (-0.92) (-1.47) (-0.24) (1.66)c (0.37) (-1.59) (1.04) (-0.50) 
 N: 432    Adjusted R2: -0.001 
-0.0094 0.0328 0.0274 -0.0070 -0.0222 -0.0240 -0.0142 0.1917 -0.0150 -0.0004 0.0025 -0.0825 -0.0006 Others 
(-0.56) (2.32)b (2.20)b (-1.00) (-0.63) (-1.00) (-1.32) (1.75)c (-0.69) (-0.25) (0.24) (-0.56) (-0.07) 




Differences in Target and Bidder Wealth Gains in Deals Involving Different Foreign Countries 
 
The 7-day cumulative abnormal returns for targets and bidders are regressed against deal characteristics in Weighted Least Square regressions. 
Other countries, cross-industry, cash, hostile, compete and take100% are binary variables set equal to one for deals where the bidder is from 
countries other than UK and Canada, cross-industry deals, pure cash offers, hostile takeovers, deals with competing bids and deals in which the 
acquirer owns 100% of the merged firm, respectively. FX is defined as the quarterly percentage deviation of U.S. real exchange rate index from its 
average level during the sample period. Size is the logged ratio of the deal value to the bidding firm’s market capitalization three months before the 
announcement date. Tax81 is a dummy variable for deals announced during 1981-1986. WWtax is a binary variable that is equal to one for U.K. 
and Japanese acquirers during the period of 1981-1986. Advisor indicates those deals in which the target firms’ financial advisors are top 








Industry Cash Hostile Compete 
Take 
100% FX Size Tax81 WWtax Advisor 
0.0860 0.0844 -0.0076 -0.0021 0.0706 -0.1544 0.1632 -0.3106  -0.0742 0.1161 -0.0104 Target 
(1.98)b (3.83)a (-0.34) (-0.08) (2.13)b (-4.78)a (4.85)a (-2.11)b  (-1.62) (2.61)a (-0.47) 
 N: 342      Adjusted R2: 0.161 
 
0.0319 -0.0117 -0.0037 -0.0131 -0.0105 -0.0008 -0.0082 0.0767 0.0022 -0.0207 0.0150 -0.0038 Bidder 
(2.99)a (-2.07)b (-0.67) (-2.07)b (-0.63) (-0.07) (-1.21) (1.84)c (1.25) (-1.38) (0.98) (-0.51) 
 N: 437     Adjusted R2: 0.017 
 




The Significance of Foreign Exchange Exposure from Stock Returns 
 
This table presents the summary statistics on the foreign exchange exposure elasticity estimates using  
stock returns as the measure of changes in firm value. The regressions are run over the 1977 through 
2000 time period.   Panel A provides the average absolute values of the exposure elasticity estimates 
and their corresponding t statistics across all 737sample firms. The last column provides the total 
percentages of firms with positive or negative exposure elasticity estimates significant at the 10% 
levels. Panel B and C provides similar statistics on firms with significantly (at 10%) negative and 
positive exposures, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Firms 
 abs(β) abs(t-β) Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 0.3720 0.87 0.05% 13.03% 
Model 2 0.3478 0.85 17.46% 10.72% 
Model 3 0.3540 0.89 17.42% 13.57% 
Model 4 0.3323 0.84 20.52% 11.13% 
 
Panel B: Firms With Significantly Negative Exposures Elasticity 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 -0.7571 -2.03 1.17% 10.99% 
Model 2 -0.6196 -1.97 22.31% 3.66% 
Model 3 -0.7271 -2.08 19.54% 9.36% 
Model 4 -0.7680 -2.00 22.32% 5.70% 
 
Panel C: Firms With Significantly Positive Exposures Elasticity 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 0.9337 1.95 1.10% 2.04% 
Model 2 0.8882 2.14 16.28% 7.06% 
Model 3 0.8850 2.02 17.67% 4.21% 






Sub-periods Foreign Exchange Exposure Elasticity Analysis 
 
This table presents the summary statistics on the foreign exchange exposure elasticity estimates for 
firms with significantly (at 10% level) positive or negative exposure elasticity in the two sub-periods. 
Each panel provides the average values of the exposure elasticity and their corresponding t -statistics 
across all the 737 firms. The last columns represent the percentage of firms with significantly (at 10% 
level) negative and positive exposure elasticity. 
 
 
Panel A: 01/1977-04/1988 
 
Firms With Significantly Negative Exposures 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 -1.0829 -2.09 2.75% 11.94% 
Model 2 -1.0077 -2.09 31.61% 7.19% 
Model 3 -1.0470 -2.09 29.76% 6.24% 
Model 4 -1.0086 -2.13 34.95% 6.24% 
 
 
Firms With Significantly Positive Exposures 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 1.4179 1.93 3.20% 0.95% 
Model 2 1.0996 2.14 27.94% 4.21% 
Model 3 1.1022 2.17 30.17% 4.88% 




Panel B: 05/1988-12/2000 
 
Firms With Significantly Negative Exposures 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 -1.2135 -2.13 2.47% 4.21% 
Model 2 -1.2045 -2.07 14.98% 3.12% 
Model 3 -1.3251 -2.22 12.80% 7.73% 
Model 4 -1.5997 -2.22 15.47% 4.34% 
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Table 14 – Cont. 
 
 
Firms With Significantly Positive Exposures 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 1 1.4569 2.13 2.72% 5.43% 
Model 2 1.2766 2.11 11.58% 10.85% 
Model 3 1.3710 2.19 10.97% 3.66% 




The Significance of Foreign Exchange Exposure from  
Earnings Forecasts 
 
This table presents the summary statistics on the foreign exchange exposure estimates using the analyst 
forecasts data. EPSjt is the mean analyst forecast of annual earnings per share for firm j in month t, Pjt 
is the price of firm j during the previous month, FXt is the exchange rate for month t. DUMit indicates 
the starting month of earning forecasts issued for a new fiscal year. The regressions are run over the 
1977 through 1996 time period.  Panel A provides the average absolute values of the exposure and the 
dummy variable estimates and their corresponding t statistics across all the 439 firms. The last column 
provides the total percentages of firms with positive or negative exposure elasticity estimates 
significant at the 10% level. Panel B and C provides similar statistics on firms with significantly (at 













































−      (6) 
Panel A: All Firms 
 abs(β) abs(t-β) Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 5 0.0569 0.95 0.002 16.86% 
Model 6 0.0512 0.87 0.325 14.12% 
 
 
Panel B: Firms with Significantly Negative Exposure 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 5 -0.2314 -2.11 0.016 3.42% 
Model 6 -0.2400 -2.19 0.275 5.01% 
 
 
Panel C: Firms with Significantly Positive Exposure 
 β t-β Adjusted R2 Percentage 
Model 5 0.0724 2.16 0.015 13.44% 







Comparison of Financial Characteristics between Firms with and without Significant 
Exchange Rate Exposure 
 
Monthly stock returns are regressed against the CRSP value weighted index returns and percentage change of 
foreign exchange rate. Firms with and without significant foreign exchange exposures are compared in terms of 
their quick ratio, short-term leverage, growth opportunities, size as measured by sales, dividend payout, R&D 
expenses and selling expenses. Differences in median between firms with and without significant exposures and 
P-values from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of no differences are also provided. a, b, and c denotes significance 
level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 
Panel A: 01/1977—04/1988 
 
Year Exposure N Quick Current 
ST-







 0 456 1.2632 2.4461 0.2341 8.4497 170 . 0.1834 0.0028 0.0305 
1977 1 67 1.2787 2.4491 0.2416 8.8181 148 . 0.1719 0.0028 0.0267 
            
 0 473 1.2597 2.4741 0.2382 8.0723 177 0.0221 0.1835 0.0028 0.0308 
1978 1 67 1.2311 2.2963 0.2440 9.3310 177 0.0215 0.1786 0.0029 0.0260 
            
 0 487 1.1981 2.3461 0.2511 8.0297 191 0.0225 0.1818 0.0027 0.0307 
1979 1 68 1.1724 2.3883 0.2510 7.4418 189 0.0235 0.2003 0.0036 0.0255 
            
 0 499 1.1615 2.2834 0.2599 7.5540 216 0.0233 0.1977 0.0026 0.0305 
1980 1 68 1.1763 2.3294 0.2570 6.7220 233 0.0240 0.2142 0.0034 0.0266 
            
 0 515 1.1708 2.2865 0.2506 6.2348 237 0.0224 0.2133 0.0031 0.0316 
1981 1 67 1.2698 2.3591 0.2489 6.2468 251 0.0234 0.2076 0.0040 0.0248 
            
 0 540 1.2069 2.3435 0.2436 5.8657 231 0.0211 0.1880 0.0032 0.0318 
1982 1 69 1.2324 2.2418 0.2348 6.8961 264 0.0225 0.1688 0.0041 0.0287 
            
 0 550 1.2956 2.4864 0.2301 5.0776 209 0.0196 0.2102 0.0036 0.0355 
1983 1 71 1.2758 2.4054 0.2153 4.6993 256 0.0200 0.2074 0.0047 0.0295 
            
 0 593 1.3679 2.5039 0.2266 5.9375 186 0.0182 0.2374 0.0036 0.0311 
1984 1 80 1.3286 2.3705 0.2271 5.6031 212 0.0212 0.1958 0.0034 0.0264 
            
 0 601 1.2662 2.4110 0.2391 6.9423 224 0.0170 0.2220 0.0039 0.0331 
1985 1 80 1.2027 2.1561 0.2314 5.8039 265 0.0171 0.2029 0.0042 0.0306 
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Year Exposure N Quick Current 
ST-







 0 612 1.2957 2.4102 0.2304 5.2197 220 0.0155 0.2503 0.0043 0.0360 
1986 1 80 1.3685 2.2021 0.2332 4.7826 269 0.0166 0.2263 0.0049 0.0319 
            
 0 615 1.2177 2.3473 0.2256 5.1030 249 0.0149 0.2861 0.0047 0.0413 
1987 1 75 1.1648 2.1832 0.2330 3.8126 310 0.0166 0.2483 0.0052 0.0331 
            
 0 622 1.2110 2.2004 0.2398 5.3547 266 0.0145 0.2683 0.0045 0.0413 
1988 1 79 1.0840 2.0682 0.2572 4.6425 351 0.0159 0.2796 0.0050 0.0392 
 (1)-(0)  -0.0070 -0.0659 -0.0004 -0.0609 36 0.0015 -0.0066 0.0007 -0.0040 
 P-value 0.47 0.04b 0.40 0.27 0.07c 0.18 0.24 0.06b 0.00a 
 
Panel B: 05/1988—12/2000 
Year Exposure N Quick Current 
ST-







 0 613 1.1857 2.1717 0.2443 5.3796 285 0.0148 0.2859 0.0047 0.0388 
1989 1 72 1.0775 2.1354 0.2550 4.9125 355 0.0148 0.3140 0.0054 0.0503 
            
 0 607 1.1796 2.1586 0.2496 4.5015 298 0.0152 0.2843 0.0045 0.0415 
1990 1 72 1.0750 2.0244 0.2653 3.7812 372 0.0133 0.4507 0.0058 0.0566 
            
 0 608 1.1218 2.1210 0.2458 4.0129 300 0.0146 0.2290 0.0048 0.0434 
1991 1 73 1.0340 2.0327 0.2571 3.0067 356 0.0121 0.3310 0.0059 0.0588 
            
 0 604 1.1435 2.0641 0.2411 3.4488 285 0.0128 0.2588 0.0046 0.0410 
1992 1 70 0.9888 1.8423 0.2502 3.3531 393 0.0106 0.3580 0.0050 0.0517 
            
 0 607 1.1125 2.0828 0.2464 4.3044 295 0.0129 0.2778 0.0045 0.0397 
1993 1 70 1.1531 2.0060 0.2334 3.5888 387 0.0091 0.3491 0.0047 0.0489 
            
 0 598 1.0998 2.0668 0.2430 4.8784 323 0.0125 0.3254 0.0044 0.0373 
1994 1 71 1.0601 2.1076 0.2367 3.8631 407 0.0083 0.3956 0.0047 0.0480 
            
 0 595 1.1030 2.0359 0.2493 6.7072 378 0.0130 0.3081 0.0040 0.0343 
1995 1 72 1.0778 1.9801 0.2648 5.6003 473 0.0091 0.3874 0.0041 0.0501 
            
 0 575 1.0960 2.0386 0.2492 6.7567 452 0.0133 0.3285 0.0039 0.0351 
1996 1 70 1.1138 2.2074 0.2409 6.0324 566 0.0110 0.3609 0.0041 0.0437 
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Year Exposure N Quick Current 
ST-







 0 556 1.0955 2.1015 0.2440 6.8538 486 0.0130 0.3531 0.0041 0.0355 
1997 1 72 1.1135 2.0979 0.2500 6.9546 598 0.0110 0.3889 0.0048 0.0421 
            
 0 523 1.0955 2.0824 0.2410 6.9001 546 0.0119 0.4136 0.0043 0.0347 
1998 1 68 1.0272 1.9560 0.2566 6.8478 594 0.0091 0.5167 0.0040 0.0426 
            
 0 486 1.0381 1.9532 0.2327 5.1961 605 0.0109 0.3800 0.0049 0.0407 
1999 1 61 1.0018 1.8466 0.2375 4.9048 824 0.0091 0.4486 0.0051 0.0400 
            
 0 445 1.0329 1.9131 0.2440 4.5698 668 0.0103 0.3808 0.0051 0.0438 
2000 1 57 1.0429 1.9684 0.2580 5.0339 930 0.0061 0.4293 0.0045 0.0455 
 (1)-(0)  -0.0402 -0.0502 0.0076 -0.3402 88 -0.0031 0.0771 0.0002 0.0093 
 P-value  0.02b 0.12 0.06c 0.24 0.05b 0.01a 0.00a 0.07b 0.00a 
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Table 17 
Comparison of Exchange Rate Exposure Between Firms with Different 
Costs of Financial Distress 
 
Each period, firms with significant exchange rate exposure are divided into high and low groups 
according to their expected costs of financial distress. The mean and median of the absolute exposure 
of each group are presented. P-values from the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of no differences in exposure 
between the two groups are also provided. a, b and c denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
 
  01/1977-04/1988  05/1988-12/2000 
  Low High  Low High 
Quick mean 0.9946 1.0555  1.5966 1.4159 
 median 0.8660 0.9523  1.0133 1.4286 
 p-value (0.10)c   (0.07)c  
       
Current mean 1.0296 1.0204  1.5812 1.4310 
 median 0.8496 0.9120  0.9215 1.3916 
 p-value (0.19)   (0.02)b  
       
ST-Leverage mean 1.0477 1.0024  1.1844 1.8178 
 median 1.0073 0.7904  1.0027 1.3887 
 p-value (0.14)   (0.01)a  
       
Coverage mean 1.1087 0.9413  1.7645 1.2523 
 median 1.0053 0.8316  1.3454 1.0411 
 p-value (0.17)   (0.09)c  
       
Size mean 1.2384 0.8116  2.0632 0.9610 
 median 1.1826 0.7369  1.6605 0.7825 
 p-value (0.00)a   (0.00)a  
       
Dividend mean 1.2488 0.8013  2.1147 0.9108 
 median 1.2041 0.7034  1.6605 0.7825 
 p-value (0.00)a   (0.00)a  
       
Leverage*log(M/B) mean 0.9695 1.0806  1.4074 1.6004 
 median 0.8313 1.0276  1.3513 1.0078 
 p-value (0.05)b   (0.07)c  
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  01/1977-04/1988  05/1988-12/2000 
  Low High  Low High 
Leverage*R&D mean 0.9108 1.0622  1.3344 1.8634 
 median 0.8363 1.0089  1.0731 1.4320 
 p-value (0.12)   (0.12)  
       
Leverage*Sellexp mean 0.9221 1.1280  1.2520 1.7492 
 median 0.8316 1.0126  1.0913 1.2894 




The Exchange Rate Exposure of Industry Portfolios 
 
For each equally and value-weighted industry portfolio, the following equation is used to estimate their 




tjjjtj RVWRETR ,, εγβα +++=  
SIC α  β  γ   α  β  γ   Trade Balance 
 Equal-weighted  Value-weighted   
20 -0.0014 0.8101 0.1671  0.0024 0.9518 -0.1100 3,986,016,534 
 (-0.71) (17.14) (1.50)  (0.91) (14.89)a (-0.73)   
22 -0.0047 0.8131 0.5679  -0.0082 0.9861 0.7112 -1,323,786,566 
 (-1.37) (9.85)a (2.91)a  (-1.93)c (9.52)a (2.91)a   
23 -0.0130 1.0573 0.9002  -0.0091 1.1571 0.4478 -31,650,729,309 
 (-3.10)a (10.35)a (3.73)a  (-2.23)b (11.62)a (1.91)c   
24 -0.0004 0.95668 0.94473  -0.0073 1.2166 0.7899 -2,386,233,313 
 (-0.09) (8.50)a (3.56)a  (-1.68)c (11.44)a (3.15)a   
25 -0.0006 0.86654 0.75092  -0.0019 0.9961 0.6647 -4,670,699,459 
 (-0.17) (9.56)a (3.51)a  (-0.62) (13.16)a (3.72)a   
26 -0.0038 0.92998 0.26828  -0.0034 0.9615 0.0119 -1,465,332,026 
 (-1.39) (14.15)a (1.73)c  (-1.07) (12.45)a (0.07)   
27 -0.0026 0.86645 0.42502  -0.0030 0.9023 0.4448 1,559,150,552 
 (-1.07) (14.69)a (3.05)a  (-1.36) (16.75)a (3.50)a   
28 -0.0033 1.15143 0.14811  0.0036 0.9612 -0.1473 16,974,721,263 
 (-0.95) (13.72)a (0.75)  (1.61) (17.74)a (-1.15)   
29 -0.0007 0.8442 -0.0695  0.0063 0.5244 -0.5227 -4,840,811,984 
 (-0.19) (8.72)a (-0.30)  (2.24)b (7.70)a (-3.25)a   
30 -0.0020 0.8505 0.5933  -0.0050 1.1373 0.3155 -4,381,189,008 
 (-0.62) (11.04)a (3.26)a  (-1.47) (13.63)a (1.60)   
31 -0.0057 0.8357 0.7806  -0.0137 1.2682 0.3524 -10,929,510,914 
 (-1.41) (8.43)a (3.34)a  (-2.59)a (9.86)a (1.16)   
32 -0.0033 0.9348 0.4545  -0.0046 1.0157 0.6621 -3,298,147,090 
 (-0.96) (11.13)a (2.29)b  (-1.22) (11.15)a (3.08)a   
33 -0.0068 0.9532 0.4307  -0.0074 1.0353 0.1206 -11,172,985,599 
 (-1.94)c (11.21)a (2.15)b  (-2.28)b (13.09)a (0.65)   
34 -0.0031 0.8683 0.4193  -0.0023 0.9066 0.2804 -591,429,141 
 (-1.06) (12.07)a (2.47)b  (-0.82) (13.12)a (1.72)c   
35 -0.0053 1.1899 0.2470  -0.0054 1.3437 -0.0359 2,083,540,273 
 (-1.32) (12.18)a (1.07)  (-1.43) (14.64)a (-0.17)   
36 -0.0024 1.2435 0.3072  0.0001 1.3421 -0.0317 -21,201,714,450 
 (-0.57) (11.96)a (1.25)  (0.01) (13.79)a (-0.14)   
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SIC α  β  γ   α  β  γ   Trade Balance 
 Equal-weighted  Value-weighted   
37 -0.0019 0.9042 0.5706  -0.0016 0.9922 0.0440 -21,745,393,972 
 (-0.58) (11.48)a (3.07)a  (-0.57) (14.96)a (0.28)   
38 -0.0039 1.0561 0.2435  -0.0003 0.9930 -0.2194 4,032,733,335 
 (-1.15) (12.71)a (1.24)  (-0.13) (18.08)a (-1.69)c   
39 -0.0103 0.9641 0.5816  -0.0047 1.0510 0.1410 -18,520,074,438 
 (-2.92)a (11.24)a (2.87)a  (-1.22) (11.17)a (0.63)   
 
a, b, and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 19 
Fixed Effect Analysis of the Time and Industry Varying Foreign 
Exchange Exposure 
 
Each year, firms are sorted into industry portfolios according to their previous year’s 2-digit SIC 
codes. Then monthly industry portfolios returns are regressed on the CRSP value weighted index 
returns, and the interaction between foreign exchange rate, industry monthly trade shares and firms’ 
financial characteristics. To facilitate comparison between different variables, we use the inverse of 
quick ratio, current ratio, size, dividend payout as the proxy for expected cost of financial distress. a, b, 
and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.    
)7(distress) financial ofcost  expected)(log(



















++=      
  α  1β  2β  3β  
No Interaction with 
Distress Cost 
  
-0.0099 0.9501 0.2153 -0.3659 
  (-2.99)a (47.88)a (3.29)a (-6.28)a 
      
1/Quick  -0.0097 0.9480 0.3333 -0.5067 
  (-2.91)a (47.64)a (3.13)a (-5.52)a 
      
1/Current  -0.0097 0.9477 0.6348 -0.9133 
  (-2.91)a (47.54)a (3.31)a (-5.38)a 
      
ST-Leverage  -0.0100 0.9489 0.6798 -1.3279 
  (-3.01)a (47.91)a (2.79)a (-6.27)a 
      
1/Size  -0.0100 0.9497 1.0333 -1.9062 
  (-3.02)a (47.94)a (3.15)a (-6.55)a 
      
1/Dividend  -0.0101 0.9550 0.0015 -0.0033 
  (-3.03)a (47.86)a (2.09)b (-5.49)a 
      
Leverage*log(M/B)  -0.0094 0.9450 0.7791 -1.3539 
  (-2.79)a (46.47)a (0.97)a (-1.79)c 
      
Leverage*Sellexp  -0.0101 0.9512 1.1192 -1.7150 
  (-3.02)a (47.78)a (4.62)a (-7.27)a 
  Industry Groups: 19 
  Time series length: 120 
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Table 20 
Reaction of Stock Price to Foreign Exchange Shocks 
 
For each firm with earning forecast changed after the announcement of Plaza Accord, the absolute 
values of the 5-day cumulative abnormal returns are calculated and regressed against firm 
characteristics as of the end of 1984 in a weighted least square regression (WLS). The result is shown 
in column one. Then these firms’ daily return volatilities in the 91 days around the announcement of 
the Plaza Accord (VAR1) are calculated and compared with their volatilities for the same period in 
1984 (VAR0). Since some firms have extremely negative interest rate coverage ratio, we replace the 
actual coverage ratio with a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a firm’s coverage ratio is 
above the sample median and zero otherwise. The logged ratios of these two volatilities are regressed 
against firm characteristics in column two.  t-statistics are in parentheses for these two columns. In 
column three, for each of the 735 sample firms, the mean absolute values of the 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around all large exchange rate movements are regressed against firm characteristics. 
t-statistics based upon White (1980) standard errors are reported in parenthesis in the third column. a, 
b, and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 The Plaza Accord 
 Other Large 
Movements 
Dependent variable CAR(-2,2)  Log(VAR1/VAR0) 
  
CAR(-2,2) 
      
Intercept 0.02794  0.1895  0.0631 
 (3.08)a  (0.79)  (9.74)a 
      
Quick 0.0026  -0.0177  0.0011 
 (1.49)  (-0.42)  (0.80) 
      
ST-Leverage 0.04333  1.0002  0.0268 
 (2.68)a  (2.34)b  (2.12)b 
      
Coverage Dummy -0.00688  -0.1267  -0.0022 
 (-2.63)a  (-1.78)c  (-1.10) 
      
Log(sales) -0.00174  -0.0936  -0.0029 
 (-2.07)b  (-3.99)a  (-4.80)a 
      
Dividend -0.15062  1.4036  -0.2511 
 (-2.93)a  (1.02)  (-3.72)a 
      
Leverage*log(M/B) 0.0087  -0.3401  0.0167 
 (0.72)  (-1.33)  (1.95)c 
      
Leverage*Sellexp -0.02301  0.1341  0.0413 
 (-0.47)  (0.13)  (1.64)c 
N 424  424  735 






Time Series of the Ratio of Mergers Relative to Other Types of Foreign Direct 
Investment in the U.S., 1987-1994 
 
Each year, the average number of M&A and other form of foreign in each of the Fama-French 48 
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